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In response to the German U-boat attacks on Allied Atlantic merchant shipping during 
the Second World War, Ernest King, the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, approved 
construction of a defensive wall of naval mines in an area off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.  
This configuration of mines was intended to provide a safe harbor opportunity for convoys 
moving along the coast. 
The currently accepted narrative of Cape Hatteras Minefield is that it was a failure.  This 
assessment is due to recent scholarship which cites the loss of three Allied ships that sunk after 
striking mines intended for Axis watercraft. As opposed to studies of the effectiveness of 
offensive or defensive weapons on mobile platforms (ships, aircraft, and terrestrial vehicles) or 
land-based defensive structures (e.g. forts and gun emplacements), this study will seek to 
understand the ways in which researchers can assess the success or failure of a different kind of 
defensive measure – a naval minefield.  In-depth historical research will be undertaken in order 
to better understand the social, economic, and wartime effects of the minefield.  Archaeological 
theories sourced from battlefield archaeology will also be applied to a virtually reconstructed 
minefield data set created with Geographic Information System (ESRI ArcGIS).  The objectives 
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of this project are to reassess how minefields are contemplated in battlefield archaeology in a 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Following the outbreak of the Second World War and the aftermath of Japan’s attack on 
Pearl Harbor, most the world’s attention was held captive by the aggressive blitzkrieg 
perpetrated by the German Heer (Army) and Luftwaffe (Air Force). Meanwhile, in the cold, dark 
depths of the Atlantic, a silent and ruthless war was taking place.  This fight was not exclusively 
between the German Ubootwaffe (U-boat) Corps and Allied warships but featured Allied 
noncombatant merchant shipping as the focal entity and more often, principal victim.  Over the 
course of the Battle of the Atlantic, approximately 36,000 merchant sailors owing allegiance to 
Allied nationalities would perish (Hughes 1977:303; White 2008:2). This carnage would reach as 
far as the North American Eastern Seaboard, into the Gulf of Mexico and South America with 
the German implementation of Operation Drumbeat in 1942, which pitted a starkly supplied 
Allied homeland defense against battle-hardened U-boat crews.  As the United States had 
stretched its East Coast assets thin due to the Lend-Lease program, the American coast and 
shipping were sluggish in implementing basic homeland wartime strategies, such as coastal 
blackouts, convoy structure, and other naval defenses, such as naval minefields (Dönitz 
1959:200).  
In May of 1942 after mobilizing necessary resources the American naval seacoast 
defense efforts came online.  Fleet Admiral Ernest King ordered the construction of several 
minefields along the eastern seaboard as well as other coastal defenses, such as antisubmarine 
nets, the Naval Section Base at Ocracoke, and patrols by ships and planes to offer safe ports of 
harbor for the newly instituted convoys (Blair 1996:456).  However, the coast of North Carolina 
was a perfect hunting ground for the German U-boats for a host of reasons.  Initially, there were 
no major defensive military installments along the coast of North Carolina to monitor the coast.  
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Concurrently, the U-boats took advantage of the protrusion of Cape Hatteras’ portion of the 
continental shelf that is less than 30 miles wide between shore and open ocean.  Convoys who 
were hugging to shallower waters in order to take advantage of air support were crammed into a 
bottleneck, one on side the extent of air support and on the other small North Carolina inlets such 
as the Ocracoke Inlet or the Hatteras Inlet that the large merchant vessels could not enter, 
offering the U-boats advantage of easy access to open water (Blair 1996:439).  
These factors gave birth to Cape Hatteras Minefield, over 2,650 Mark VI contact mines 
placed in an overlapping half-moon arrangement around Cape Hatteras with the intention of 
creating a “safe” harbor (Figures 1 and 2).  The Mark VI mine was a surplus, featuring “horns” 
that when in contact with a metal hull ship would create an electric connection detonating the 
mine.  This technological advancement made the Mark VI mine relatively more stable and 
appropriate for homeland defense (Bureau of Naval Ordinance 1955:376).
 
FIGURE 1. Confidential Section of USC&GS Chart 1232 showing the location and configuration of the Hatteras 





Previous Research and Importance 
 Before this thesis, there has been no attempt at a dedicated work centered around Cape 
Hatteras Minefield.  Much of the data collection had to be taken from either primary sources or 
small sections in secondary works. The largest composites of information pertaining to Cape 
Hatteras Minefield are contained within two other Battle of the Atlantic theses.  These belong to 
John Wagner (2010), “Waves of Carnage: A Historical, Archaeological and Geographical Study 
of the Battle of the Atlantic in North Carolina Waters” and John Bright (2012) “The Last 
Ambush: An Adapted Battlefield Analysis of the U-576 Attack upon Allied Convoy KS-520 off 
Cape Hatteras During the Second World War”. These two works were instrumental in 
FIGURE 2. U.S. Navy chart showing the location and configuration of the Hatteras minefield, including how the 
sectors were divided (Source: National Archives). 
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accumulating base information and made researching Cape Hatteras Minefield much easier. 
However, both maintain the idea that Cape Hatteras Minefield was a failure as did the primary 
sources that provided this opinion (to be discussed).  Their sections on Cape Hatteras Minefield 
were purely the retelling of history and lacked any archaeological analysis, as the minefield was 
only a small portion of their wider scope. In turn, Cape Hatteras Minefield has often been passed 
over, and its traditional failure narrative has never been truly examined. Therefore, the 
importance of this thesis lies in the ability to flesh out an often passed over, uncharacteristic 
patterned defensive structure, while serving as a dedicated source of information. Additionally, it 
allows Cape Hatteras Minefield and its negative connotations to be examined through 
archaeological study. Further, it serves to fill in another small piece of the work that NOAA is 
performing during their Battle of the Atlantic surveys (2008-present). 
 
Objectives  
The dominant narrative of the minefield is that it was a failure. Between 15 June and 19, 
July 1942 merchant ships F.W. Abrams, Chilore, and Keshena [another vessel hit a mine but did 
not sink] all struck mines and were lost while there were no German U-boat casualties due to 
mines.  There were other attacks directly associated with the minefield as well, most notably, the 
U.S. Navy vessel USS YP-389 that was patrolling the minefield when it was attacked by U-701 
(Hickam 1989:291).  The United States Navy was responsible for marking the minefield only as 
a hazardous navigation area on charts, instead of divulging the true destructive nature of the 
minefield.  This deception meant that for the duration of the minefield’s existence, merchant 
shipping would have no knowledge of the hazardous navigation area’s true nature.  As with any 
military endeavor, collateral damage should not only be understood as possible but also expected 
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and allowed for in planning. Operational Security, or OPSEC as it is known, has always been a 
dangerous dam regulating the natural ebb and flow of battlefield information. The United States 
Navy could ill afford to announce openly the location or even the existence of the minefield, 
least the element of surprise be destroyed.  The divulgence of the site of Cape Hatteras Minefield 
would only serve to open a major opportunity for the German U-boats to find a route inside the 
areas of safe anchorage and wreak havoc on the merchant ships enjoying false amnesty from the 
raging Battle of the Atlantic (Lott 1959:44). 
This research is an attempt to assess the effectiveness of this defense structure in detail 
and reassess this narrative.  It will evaluate the Hatteras Minefield considering the assumption 
that the objective of a defensive structure is not to cause damage to an enemy force (no army 
builds a wall in hopes that it falls and crushes their enemy). Cape Hatteras Minefield is one of 
several examples of mines being used as a physical barrier on the American East Coast. This is 
in stark comparison to the German offensive mining that was done along the American East 
Coast (Caram 2011:28). Additionally, it will attempt to examine the many factors that 
precipitated the loss of merchant ships F.W Abrams, Chilore, and Keshena.  Finally, this study 
intends to follow a process informed by battlefield archaeological theory in order to attempt to 
measure the effectiveness of the minefield.  A series of research questions, outlined below, will 
be used to reevaluate the success or failure of the minefield, which will be used to either redefine 
or reinforce the narrative of failure.  Potentially, the methods employed may be extrapolated to 
other minefields from the Second World War, such as the Key West Minefield.  Also, a 
comparison highlighting the unique nature of Cape Hatteras Minefields may be made in contrast 




It is important to reconsider Cape Hatteras Minefield as it is an atypical defensive structure and 
tactic in America’s history, in this case it serves to artificially create a navigational hazard into 
open ocean to protect a port. It is one thing to wall of the entrance to a port but Cape Hatteras 
Minefield was in one package an offensive weapon of destruction, a defensive weapon and a 
neutral navigational hazard.   In the same way that the National Register of Historic Places 
qualifies sites in part if they are exemplary models “or that represent a significant and 
distinguishable entity” (NHRP Staff 1990:2).  Another consideration, with the amount of work 
FIGURE 3. Hand-drawn map by KptLt. Horst Degen, Skipper of U-701 depicting mines that he and his crew laid in 
Chesapeake Bay, Virginia on 13 June 1942 (Source: Caram 2011:28). 
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being undertaken by NOAA to document the Battle of the Atlantic, it is important that every 
aspect is accurately represented. 
 
Research Questions 
Research will focus on answering a primary research question by asking a series of 
secondary research questions. These questions will focus the research on quantifiable factors for 
determining the relative success, or failure, of the naval minefield. 
 
Primary: 
 What methods are suitable for the assessment of the success or failure of naval 
minefields, specifically Cape Hatteras Minefield, during the Second World War? 
Secondary: 
How can the success of a minefield be defined? 
 Categorizing Minefields 
o Minefields are both passive and active depending on the situation; therefore, can 
they be assessed by a single set of standards? 
 Survival and Safety 
o Can the safe passage of tonnage past Cape Hatteras whose goods were used to 
fuel the war effort be cited as the success of the minefield? 
How can the failure of a minefield be ascertained? 
 Economic losses 
o How many ships were lost? 
o How much gross tonnage was lost? 
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This work is broken up into seven chapters. Chapter One: Introduction, focuses on 
introducing the work and includes a brief historical background, the objectives of this study, the 
research questions that framed the study and the structure breakdown. The introduction 
transitions into the second chapter, History. Chapter Two: History includes information 
regarding the climate in which the Battle of the Atlantic created, and therefore the need for 
coastal defenses to guard against the German U-boat’s attacks on Allied merchant shipping.  
progresses into the process in which Cape Hatteras Minefield was proposed, accepted and 
implemented by the Fifth Naval District. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to the 
narrative of the destructive events that surround the minefield, particularly that of F.W. Abrams, 
Chilore, and Keshena.  
Chapter Three: Theory then focuses on the theoretical framework in which the 
archaeological components of the work were based upon. Foremost, the theory of historical 
archaeology is responsible for the ability to reconcile the historical data in the form of maps with 
the practice of archaeological analysis. In conjunction with historical archaeology, battlefield 
archaeology was the main structural thesis for the final analysis. Within the use of battlefield 
archaeology, methods for battlefield assessment created by the U.S. Army known as METT-T 
(Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available, and Time Available) and KOCOA (Key Terrain, 
Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover, and Concealment) were important for better 
understanding the battlefield landscape.  Finally, because of the heavy use of Geographic 
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Information System (GIS) data a specific theoretical structure concerning the use of GIS was 
used.  
Chapter Four: Methodology recounts the process by which historical research was 
performed throughout the data collection process for both primary and secondary sources. It also 
goes into the process by which the rubbersheeting and map creation were performed in some 
depth. This is important as the technology that drives GIS is ever-evolving. Chapter Five: 
Results consists of the results produced from GIS creation, as well as the various graphs and 
charts that resulted from historical research. This moves to Chapter Six: Analysis in which the 
archaeological meaning of the materials in Chapter Five: Results is ascertained. Finally, Chapter 
Seven: Conclusion wraps up the project and reiterates what was learned from the project. This is 


















CHAPTER TWO: History 
Introduction 
As the dust at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii settled and the year 1942 opened, the world saw the 
American war machine begin to plan its protracted offensives in European and Pacific theaters. 
While much of the American military focused on offensive operations, homeland defense was 
becoming a pressing issue. On 15 January 1942, a meeting was held in Washington DC by naval 
personnel to discuss implementing additional coastal defenses, with the intent to guard against 
opening hostilities by German U-boats which, would eventually evolve into Operation 
Paukenschlag (Operation Drumbeat), the German Unterseeboot (U-boat) offensive. Deliberated 
in this meeting was the proposal of laying more mines along the coast from Cape Cod, 
Massachusetts to Key West Florida. With this plan agreed upon, it initially saw frequent delays 
due to difficulty in acquiring proper ships to lay mines as well as foul weather. While it was 
completed and put into use, the life of Cape Hatteras Minefield would be short-lived.  The 
unfortunate drawback of mines being non-discriminatory saw the sinking of F.W. 
FIGURE 4. Map showing the rough distance the continental shelf extends out into open ocean from Cape Hatteras 





Abrams, J.A. Mowinckel, and Keshena.  Each Allied ship lost served as a metaphorical nail in the 
coffin, leading to the ultimate deactivation of the minefield in April of 1943 (ESF 1943:11-
13,chap. 5; Wagner 2012:102).  
 
Conception and Construction 
The plan, initially proposed by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Earnest King, 
was met with reserve and disdain by Admiral Adolphus Andrews. Admiral Andrews believed 
that the mines would be of little concern to the German U-boats and would pose a significant 
danger to Allied merchant shipping that frequented the harbors proposed for mining. After 
several attempts to voice his growing concern over the relative danger of the mines, Admiral 
Andrews yielded to his superiors and proceeded with preparations. However, this passive 
behavior would not last for long. As the Cape Cod and Cape Ann minefields were unremittingly 
delayed, Admiral Andrews would once again vocalize his disapproval of the minefields, instead 
offering a plan of a swift offensive campaign against the Germans to clear them from American 
waters. Andrews also argued that “Minefields are a menace to friendly as well as enemy vessels. 
To require the Frontier to protect friendly vessels from its own weapons is a task that should be 
forced upon it by the enemy- not voluntarily adopted” (ESF 1942b; Andrews in Freeman 
1987:61). Regrettably, for Andrews, the rampant success of the German U-boats was indeed 
forcing the U.S. Navy to consider adding additional minefields. 
One of the major geographical advantages offered to German U-boats was the 
bathymetry of the North Carolina coast. The continental shelf is, at its narrowest, only roughly 
33.5 nautical miles in width (Figure 4). This allowed U-boats to attack and quickly make it back 
to the safety of deep water (Blair 1996:439). These benefits were a factor in the U-boat captain’s 
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successes in the region and drawing the ire and attention of the U.S. Navy. In February of 1942, 
the leadership within the American Navy met once again to discussing mining options to defend 
against a fluid situation with the German U-boats. This time, however, instead of two small 
mined harbors, the Commander of the Inshore Patrol of the Fifth Naval District submitted that all 
coastlines susceptible to U-boat attack have a minefield constructed to make up for inadequate 
military surface and air vessels. This plan would be heavily debated over the next several months 
and would take until April 1942 for the submission of two distinct operational plans for 
consideration. The first would echo the proposal by the Commander of the Inshore Patrol of the 
Fifth Naval District and consist of a mined barrier stretching from Cape Hatteras to Cape 
Canaveral totaling 30,000 mines and over 600 miles of ocean (ESF 1942b; Eastern Sea Frontier 
1943:3; Freeman 1987:192). 
Ultimately, the sheer scale of this task would incur heavy costs, not only monetarily but 
in the constant upkeep that the plan would require. Minesweepers would have to patrol 
constantly for loose mines that had the possibility of drifting into the shipping channel, and the 
spread-out nature of mines made it impossible to discern if the mines could keep the U-boats at 
bay (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:191-193; Wagner 2012:85). The second plan of action consisted 
of laying a network of mined anchorages that would populate the East Coast and would provide 
merchant vessels safe haven during the night. The network would comprise six mined 
anchorages, beginning in New York and ending in Florida and would utilize less than half of the 
mines that the first option required, totaling only 14,000 total mines. The smaller fields would 
also require fewer patrol vessels, which were already at a premium.  However, there were still 
drawbacks to this plan: 
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The downsides of using mined anchorages included the fact that merchant 
ships would need to be routed further out to sea to get around the 
minefields, further exposing them to U-boats during the day and making it 
harder to provide them with coverage, and requiring them to plan their 
travel times around stopping at anchorages. This would ultimately increase 
the travel time required to complete a voyage and slow the transportation of 
supplies (Wagner 2012:86). 
 
Due to the relative safety and lower cost of the smaller mined anchorages, the U.S. Navy 
ultimately decided to implement the second plan and poignantly directed Andrews, the biggest 
antagonist to the minefield system to oversee the installation of the mined anchorages. In 
response to the increased volume of attacks in North Carolina waters, Andrews suggested that 
Cape Hatteras and Cape Fear be the first anchorages mined (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:193). 
After the plan had been put into place, the Fifth Naval District became aware of the need for the 
establishment of a small naval outpost to support the day-to-day operations of the minefield (ESF 
1943:4,5,12). The choice was made for Ocracoke Island to become the home for the outpost and 
Captain Henry Coyle of the Coast Guard was appointed Convoy Dispatcher, Hatteras, Lookout 
and Cape Fear Area (ESF 1943:5-6). 
 With the remainder of April being used to complete the planning stages of the project, 22 
May 1942 was issued as a deadline for the completion of Cape Hatteras Minefield. Due to the 
inadequate number of minelaying vessels available, progress was halted in Hatteras until the 
completion of the Key West Minefield due to the availability of minelayers that were already 
operating in Florida. This shortage of vessels, however, did not stop preparations from taking 
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place, and on 6 May 1942, a notice issued to commercial mariners warned that a “Danger Area” 
had been established around Cape Hatteras though the true destructive nature of why the area 
had become a danger zone was kept secret (ESF 1943:6; Wagner 2012:88).  
Five days later (11 May 1942), the Fifth Naval District remarked that it was “Assembling 
materials for Hatteras anchorage” (ESF 1942a:13) and would continue over the next several 
days. At this point in the war, CNO Admiral Ernest King would be promoted to Commander in 
Chief of the United States Navy and would leave the completion of the minefield to the newly 
appointed Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. It was left up to 
Admiral Ingersoll to corral enough resources for the completion of the project. On 20 May 1942, 
the minelaying package (Table 1) sailed from the Naval Mine Depot in Yorktown, Virginia and 
would begin work on the first leg of the minefield the following day (ESF 1942a:23; Miller 
1942; Bright 2012:145). A notice issued on the same day by the Hydrographic Office stated that 
a “Danger Area” had been established and that:  
 
The only passage through the dangerous area to the anchorage is from Lighted 
bell Buoy HA, black and white vertically striped and showing a short- long 
flashing white light, located in lat. 35°00’59”N., lon. 75°58’19”W., through a 
channel 1000 yards wide in a 60° direction for a distance of approximately 11 
miles. A lightship has been established in lat. 35°01’12”N., lon.75°59’06”W., 





Further preparations, made on 22 May 1942 included ordering Captain Coyle to establish 
24-hour patrols to ensure that the minelaying process went smoothly and was not interrupted. To 
launch the “Hatteras minefield patrol” Coyle was only given a small group of five Coast Guard 
cutters that were supplemented by YP-388 and YP-389, fishing trawlers that the navy seized and 
converted (ESF 1942b, 1943:7; Headquarters Fifth Naval District 1942:9; Freeman 
1987:328,352; Wagner 2012:89). Only four days past the original deadline on 26 May 1942 the 
minefield was announced compete (Figure 5).  Due to the relative stability of its payload, the 
task of homeland defense was left to the Naval Mark VI mine (Bureau of Naval Ordinance 
1955:376; Campbell 1985:167; Friedman 1988:111; Bright 2012:143). There exists a slight 
discrepancy on the final number of Mark VI mines that constitute the double crescent-shaped 
TABLE 1.  
MINELAYING PACKAGE FOR CAPE HATTERAS MINEFIELD  
 




field. One document in Record Group 38 states that there were 2,635 mines laid with a premature 
percentage of 3.1% or 82 premature detonations (ESF 1942d). This statistic would put the final 
number at 2,553 mines (Figure 6). A second document within the same record group shows the 
final number at 2,860 mines laid. Both documents agree on the first leg consisting of 1,440 
mines, but the first source states that only 1,195 mines were laid on the second leg while the 
second shows 1,420. Each leg of the minefield stretched 17 miles long and overlapped for two 
miles in the center, spaced to create a 1.5-mile entrance. The first leg, Leg 1 (East) consisted of 
four rows of mines; each row spaced 500 yards apart. The second leg, however, Leg 2 (West) 
was only constructed with three rows of mines with the rows once again spaced 500 yards apart 
(ESF 1943:12; Wagner 2012:89,90). This difference in leg layers may explain why there was a 
discrepancy in the number of mines in Leg 2 and favors the first document’s number of 1,195 
mines.  
Regardless, after the completion of the minefield, a series of several “Notices To 
Mariners,” namely “Restricted Notice to Mariners No. 9 and No. 12” were issued on 7 May and 
13 May 1942 respectively, to warn against the hazardous area that Cape Hatteras Minefield now 
occupied. These notices were kept intentionally vague in order to preserve operational security 
but detailed the procedures of how to safely enter the area with a naval escort and the 




FIGURE 5. Confidential Section of USC&GS Chart 1232 showing the location and configuration of the Hatteras 




Total Number of Mines Laid: 2,635 
 
Mines Laid for Leg One: 1,440 
Mines Laid for Leg Two: 1,195 
 




The First Nail: F.W. Abrams 
Unfortunately, Cape Hatteras Minefield would force Admiral Andrews’ fear of damage 
to merchant shipping to manifest quickly in the loss of the oil tanker F.W. Abrams (Figure 7). 
Beginning its voyage in early May from Aruba to New York with 90,000 barrels of oil under the 
command of Captain Anthony Coumelis along with a crew of 35, the instructions issued by the 
British to F.W. Abrams contained no mention of the newly implemented minefield (Williamson 
2006:134). This ignorance, however, was by design; only naval personnel were aware of the true 
nature of the “Danger Area.” The crew of F.W. Abrams was already in violation of Admiral 
Andrews’ orders that tankers were not to sail the coast without a convoy. This lack of respect for 
naval directions was not an isolated event; some merchant captains chose to sail alone, against 
the orders to convoy as they did not trust the navy to protect them (Geroux 2016:94). 
 




Regardless of Captain Coumelis’ feelings, this decision would cost the crew as F.W. 
Abrams’ journey progressed (Hickam 1996:275). On 10 June 1942, F.W. Abrams passed into 
North Carolina waters and was quickly hailed by the escort ship CG-484, one of the vessels 
making up the Hatteras minefield patrol. After anchoring the night within the protective 
enclosure of the minefield, F.W. Abrams the crew was set to continue their voyage the next 
morning. However, the weather on 11 June 1942 would make that difficult.  Beset by downpours 
and heavy fog, F.W. Abrams quickly lost sight of CG-484 and, being ignorant of the threat of 
friendly naval mines; the choice was made to push out to open sea of their own accord (Freeman 
1987:345; Wagner 2010:91; Bright 2012:110).   
At 0650 Eastern War Time (EWT), the first explosion shook F.W. Abrams. The captain, 
realizing the tanker was not in the danger of immediately sinking, decided to drop anchor and 
radio for help, this was an incredibly risky choice to carry out in water where known U-boats 
were patrolling. However, due to a jammed anchor chain, F.W. Abrams was left to drift 
helplessly in an area ripe with naval mines and German U-boats. Not even 40 minutes later at 
0717 EWT, a second explosion ripped through the starboard side of F.W. Abrams. Still afloat by 
0737 EWT, a third mine would devastate the bow. Finally defeated, F.W. Abrams began to sink, 
which forced the crew to abandon it to the depths. The official report from the ESF War Diary 
states “SS ABRAMS en route from Ocracoke anchorage in foggy weather encountered Navy 
Mine Field while apparently steering the improper course, struck mines and sank in 34/59/24 – 
75/48/18” (ESF 1942a:13). While the cause of sinking was straightforward, blame for the 
incident became quickly convoluted. As Captain Coyle began investigating the breakdown in 
communication between CG-484 and F.W. Abrams a number of different after action reports 
began coming forward. The Coast Guard crew claimed that F.W. Abrams ignored orders and 
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failed to respond to several instructions, this then evolved into claims of torpedo wakes, 
seemingly anything to avoid taking responsibility for the incident. This event, regardless where 
the blame falls, marks only the beginning of the tainted history of Cape Hatteras minefield (ESF 
194344:7,8; Freeman 1987:345-346; Wagner 2012:92). 
 
The Second Nail: The Battle of YP-389 and U-701 
Due to the overwhelming need for combat vessels for overseas operations as well as for 
the protection of major ports, Cape Hatteras Minefield was outfitted with YP-388 and YP-389 
(Figure 8). While designated “Yard Patrol” (YP), these vessels were converted fishing trawlers 
ill-prepared for wartime purposes. After conversion, at Naval Submarine Base New London, 
Connecticut, the vessels were given orders to make their way down the coast as convoy escorts 
until they reached their destination at Cape Hatteras (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:352; 
Hickam1989:285-286; Wagner 2012:6). 
 
FIGURE 8.  Photograph showing Cohasset, before the military conversion to YP-398 (Source: National Archives). 
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These vessels, specifically YP-389, could only handle a maximum speed of 9 knots and 
could, on an exceedingly favorable day, make 10 knots. It is understandable why then the vessel 
failed as a convoy escort; the convoy’s speed at 8.5 knots put a massive strain on the vessel and 
forced frequent stops for repairs (ESF 1942b, 1943:8; Headquarters Fifth Naval District 1942:3-
6,9-10; Freeman 1987:352; Wagner 2012:93).  
After reaching Cape Hatteras already in rough condition, the two vessels were to begin 
their roles with insignificant armament. Both vessels were outfitted only with two .30 caliber 
machine guns, one 3-inch gun as well as four racked depth charges and two spares (Figure 9). 
This armament was entirely insufficient for warding off U-boat attacks, and YP-389 would pay 
dearly for the lack of warfighting tools the U.S. Navy had bestowed upon the vessel. Slotted for 
their first 5-day patrol from 11 June to 16 June, YP-389 befell more mechanical issues, this time; 
it was the 3-inch gun that refused to fire (Headquarters Fifth Naval District 1942:3-6, 9, 10; ESF 
1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987:352,353; Wagner 2012:93). 
 
FIGURE 9. YP class vessel, notice the depth charge barrels mounted to the stern (National Archives). 
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Upon returning to Section Base Ocracoke, it was determined that the weapon’s firing 
spring was broken, and the replacement part would have to be provisioned through Operations at 
Morehead City. Put back out to patrol on 18 June the crew of YP-389 had no idea what was 
awaiting them or how woefully unprepared they were 7 (ESF 1942b, 1943:8; Headquarters Fifth 
Naval District 1942:3-6, 9, 10; Freeman 1987:352,353; Wagner 2012:93). 
Under the command of Kapitänleutenant Horst Degen, U-701 was a type VIIC 
commissioned 16 July 1941. Capable of 17 knots on the surface, 7 knots submerged, U-701 
carried 14 torpedoes, 26 TMA magnetic sea mines, and was crewed by anywhere between 44-52 
men (Stern 1991:38-47). Sailing from Lorient, U-701 began its journey on 20 May 1942, hoping 
to gain the same success and fame as other U-boats had done during Operation Drumbeat. This 
honor, however, would not come to fruition. The crew missed several opportunities on its voyage 
across the Atlantic, one being the Swedish Drottningholm, which was carrying Axis diplomats 
and therefore was allowed to go on its way, and the other being a British ocean liner that was out 
of range and moving too fast for U-701 to catch. These failures had a significant effect on the 
crew, and tensions began to rise. After narrowly escaping an Allied aircraft on 12 June, U-701 
began its given mission of mining the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Unknown to the crew, 
this minelaying operation would wreak major havoc on the Allies, ultimately sinking two ships 
and damaging two more. On 16 June, the crew would be consumed with frustration, missing an 
8,000-ton freighter with two torpedoes (B.d.U.1942b:78-79,117; OCNO 1942:10-12; Hickam Jr. 
1989:267-261,281; Wagner 2012:95). 
With tempers extremely high, and the fear of having to return failures weighing on the 
crew, an unsuspecting YP-389 would serve to reduce the crew’s stress. At 0245 on 19 June, the 
two vessels made contact, and immediately the crew of YP-389 realized how helpless they were. 
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With only two .30 caliber machine guns online, they would only serve to give away the patrol 
vessel’s position. While attempting evasive maneuvers being constantly bombarded by 3-inch 
shells, YP-389 could do nothing more but attempt to maintain course back to shore. Eventually, a 
3-inch round from U-701 found its way into YP-389’s chart room, setting the vessel on fire. At 
this point, there was nothing the crew could do to save the vessel and furthermore there was no 
way for the crew to deploy life rafts as two had been shot away and the equipped lifeboats were 
too exposed to U-701’s constant fire to lower. With the only choice left to the crew being to 
abandon ship, Lieutenant R.J. Phillips ordered his men directly into the water with only life vests 
to maintain their buoyancy (Hickman 1989:291).  
After four hours afloat, watching their vessel sink (Figure 10), the crew was finally 
picked up by Coast Guard cutters at 0800 EWT (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:354; Hoyt 2008:8; 
NOAA 2016). It is here that the minefield is traditionally credited with its second victim (ESF 
1942b, 1943:8; Freeman 1987: 355; Wagner 2012:96). While YP-389 did not strike a mine, the 
minefield’s existence was the reason the vessel was near U-701. The lack of proper equipment 
due to the strain on resources led to the loss of six Allied lives. This loss was enough for the 
Eastern Sea Frontier to place a hold on the future construction of the remaining minefield 
 




anchorages and instead wait until they could be adequately furnished with patrols (ESF 
1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987: 355; Wagner 2012:96).  
The Final Nail: Convoy KS-520 
Soon after the incident with F.W. Abrams, the effectiveness of the mined anchorage plan 
was once again called into question. On 14 July 1942, convoy KS-520 left port at Lynnhaven 
Road, Virginia and would be the minefield’s ultimate undoing. After leaving Virginia at 0430 
EWT, the convoy reached Cape Hatteras at around 0700 EWT 15 July without incident. The 
convoy consisted of 19 merchant vessels (Figure 11) organized into seven columns escorted by 
two Coast Guard cutters, two destroyers, one corvette, two PCs (Coastal Patrol Vessels) and was 
covered in the air by two allied aircraft (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:411).   
  
FIGURE 11. A Tenth Fleet convey chart depicting the role for Convoy KS-520.  Notice the incorrect notation 
at the top of the page asserting that three vessels were sunk, in reality, only two were lost (Tenth Fleet Convoy 
and Routing Files Box 78, National Archives). 
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At 1600 EWT about 20 miles away from Ocracoke Inlet the convoy made first contact 
with U-576 and after two unsuccessful attacks contact was broken. While the entire convoy was 
now on alert, though it would not be enough for the convoy to escape unscathed. At 1625 EWT, 
Chilore (Figure 12) was struck for the first time by a torpedo from U-576 on the vessel's port 
bow and was still afloat when Chilore was then hit by a second torpedo this time on the port 
beam. The Convoy Commodore, Captain N.L. Nichols (retired) witnessed the attack from the 
vessel J.A. Mowinckel, but before he had time to react and give evasive orders, J.A. Mowinckel’s 
stern was struck by another of U-576’s torpedoes leaving a 20 by 20ft hole and damaging 
steering machinery (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:412). The attack on J.A. Mowinckel claimed two 
lives and injured 20 more, adding to the panic onboard. Given time to react, the remainder of the 
convoy began to scatter as Chilore, and J.A. Mowinckel fell out of line, but U-576 had already 
chosen its next victim.  Only two minutes had passed since J.A. Mowinckel was hit before 
Bluefields was struck amidships (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:412).  
 
FIGURE 12. Image showing Chilore at dock (Norfolk Public Library). 
27 
 
Over the next 40 minutes, the convoy escorts frantically searched for the U-boat with no 
results while Nichols realized that J.A. Mowinckel (Figure 13) with 20 men in need of medical 
attention and Chilore, who had been hit twice needed to find their way to safety. What was not 
known at the time is that U-576 was sank within 15 to 20 minutes of sinking Bluefields (NOAA 
2008). Bluefields did not hold much concern for Nichols because it had sunk completely by 1700 
EWT while its crew had been picked up by the escort ship Spry. After a doctor transferred from 
McCormick to J.A. Mowinckel and Spry had been given orders to escort the two injured vessels 
to the nearest port. With Spry leading and J.A. Mowinckel steering by only its engines, the 
vessels began their 20- mile journey towards Cape Hatteras.  The course the small convoy 
plotted would ultimately be its downfall, set for 315 degrees true would lead the vessels directly 
into Hatteras Inlet slightly below the danger area of the minefield (ESF 1942b, 1943:10; 
Freeman 1987:413-415; Wagner 2012:98). 
 
FIGURE 13. Photo of J.A. Mowinckel while still in service of the ESSO Petroleum Company (Uboat.net). 
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Several issues contributed to the overall failure of the next several hours. Lieutenant 
Commander (LtCdr) Maxim Firth, commanding officer of Spry, knew of the minefield due to 
Conhydrolant (Confidential Hydrographic Office Report) Notice 32 but was incorrect on his 
dead reckoning and was 60 miles further south than he realized (ESF 1942a). This was a normal 
occurrence for escort ships to only have a dead reckoning level of navigation as they were often 
dispatched away from the convoy to hunt threats (Freeman 1987:414).  Nichols, however, knew 
exactly where the vessels were but would later claim that he had never seen Notice to Mariners 
175 and, therefore, had no knowledge of the danger area surround Hatteras. Before the ships 
began under weigh to safety, Nichols appointed the Vice Commodore in control of the convoy 
effectively making himself simply a passenger aboard J.A. Mowinckel with no operational 
control. However, the master of J.A. Mowinckel agreed to allow Nichols a degree of control due 
to his vast experience as a retired U.S. Navy Captain (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:415).   
As the three vessels progressed and communication began to flow between Lieutenant 
Commander Firth aboard Spry (Figure 14) and Nichols aboard J.A. Mowinckel, it was soon 
realized by LtCdr. Firth that the current course was taking them directly into the minefield. To 
attempt to remedy this, LtCdr. Firth radioed “You should head for a position 15 miles 227 true 
from Hatteras Inlet according to latest information” (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:416).  This 
course would have put the vessels at the opening to the minefield. However, there was no 
response from Nichols or any onboard J.A. Mowinckel. Instead of reissuing the course change, 
the LtCdr. was afraid of questioning the Commodore a second time due to his prior service as a 
Captain. With the warning unheeded, it would be up to the patrol vessels to perform their duty of 
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preventing vessels from inadvertently wandering into the minefield.  Thus, another opportunity 
for a breakdown in protocol (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:416).  
The minefield was directed to have three 400 class Coast Guard patrol vessels.  These 
Coast Guard vessels were 83 feet in length and could reach a top speed of 20 knots.  The 400 
class was intended to be used not only in the capacity of hunting U-boats but to handle search 
and rescue missions as well as mundane patrol tasks (Flynn 2014:18). On 15 July, only one of 
the three was on patrol. CG-463 (Call Sign NLUO) had been detached to aid the hunt of the U-
boat, and CG-462 (Call Sign NLUN) was ferrying gasoline to one of the YP vessels attached to 
the minefield, leaving CG-480 (Call Sign NLVH) alone to patrol the entire minefield. The crew 
aboard CG-463 witnessed the three vessels move past, but due to the presence of Spry, a naval 
vessel, the commanding officer of CG-463 saw no reason to contact the vessels. Shortly after 
CG-463 failed to make contact, a naval blimp spotted the vessels and dropped smoke bombs 
ahead of their position. These signals were incorrectly taken by Commodore Nichols as a 
FIGURE 14. Image showing USS Spry (PG-64), formally HMS Hibiscus. The vessel was a flower-class corvette 
that the United States acquired for homeland defense (National Archives). 
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warning for U-boats in the area while the blimp had been attempting to warn of the danger of the 
vessel's current course. 
At 1930 EWT, the three vessels were spotted by CG-462, who was returning from its 
supply run. The crew attempted to catch up with the injured vessels to warn them off their 
current heading, going as far to signal with their blinkers and fire their guns. The sound of a loud 
explosion at 2000 EWT ended CG-462’s efforts.  The uproar, caused by Chilore and J.A. 
Mowinckel was the result by both striking mines.  The crew, fearing they were under attack once 
again by German U-boats, filed into lifeboats and made it safely ashore. Once CG-462 had the 
time to catch up to the vessels and make contact with Spry did LtCdr. Firth understand the 
amount of danger facing his crew. Without the ability to do anything for the severely injured but 
still afloat merchant vessels, Spry was led to safety by CG-462 and was able to reestablish 
contact with KS-520 (ESF 1942b, 1943:8; Freeman 1987:418; Wagner 2012:100).  
While the events surrounding the attack of KS-520 were chaotic, as far as Chilore and 
J.A. Mowinckel were concerned they were not over. As both vessels were still afloat, two 
tugboats were detached to tow the two merchant vessels to safety on 19 July. While a secure 
channel was swept for this towing operation, at around 1630 EWT the tug, Keshena ventured out 
of the security zone, striking a mine and sinking quickly. The other tug, J.A Martin managed to 
pull both merchant vessels out of harm’s way (Standard Oil Company 1946:36; Bright 
2012:151). While J.A. Mowinckel was able to be ultimately repaired and be put back into service, 
Chilore capsized near the Chesapeake Bay, Virginia on 24 July (SOC 1946:370-371; Bright 
2012:152). The traditional narrative attributes Chilore’s ultimate demise as the fault of the 
minefield (Figure 15). After the culmination of the events of KS-520, many within the Fifth 




FIGURE 15. Handwritten chart showing the fates of vessels lost or damaged during the Battle of the Atlantic 





On 21 July 1942, Admiral Andrews finally vindicated in his opposition to the minefield, 
petitioned King to replace the hazardous minefield with anti-torpedo netting. Andrews not only 
cited the events surrounding Abrams, Chilore, and Keshena as evidence for the removal of the 
minefield but also suggested that since the convoy system had been put online, the safety of 
merchant shipping had risen above the need for the minefields protection (ESF 1942b, 1943:8; 
Freeman 1987:415-419; Wagner 2012:100). Andrews also asserted that the failure to warn 
mariners of the actual nature of the danger area had contributed to the minefield’s failure due to 
the mariner’s confusion and apathy. Two weeks later, on 4 August 1942 King issued his 
response to Andrews, once again denying him the ability to remove the minefield. King believed 
that the geography of Cape Hatteras was such that anti-torpedo nets were not capable of ensuring 
the safety of merchant shipping. King did cede the fact that the confusion created by labeling the 
field as a “Danger Area” needed to be rectified and mariners alerted to the destructive nature of 
the minefield. At this point, the need to keep the knowledge of the minefield away from 
nonmilitary personnel was moot, enough of the merchant mariners had been alerted to the mines 
that operational security had been dissolved (ESF 1943:8-11; Wagner 2012:101).  
As the Fifth Naval District and the men stationed at Ocracoke continued to maintain what 
was seen as a derelict defense system, their sparse resources and munitions began to dwindle. 
The patrol vessels were required to guard the minefield regardless if merchant vessels were 
utilizing it and the regular routine began to take the toll on the ill-suited vessels. Moreover, only 
one ship had sought the safety of the anchorage in three months. On 6 November 1942 Admiral 
Andrews once again pleaded with Admiral King, suggesting that the mines be removed, but the 
area still be treated as a danger zone. Admiral King, seemingly growing tired of Admiral 
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Andrews’ requests, simply stated that no minesweepers were available for use by the Fifth Naval 
District and that none would be free until the following year around springtime, and that 
Andrews should wait until then to once again approach the issue (ESF 1943:11; Wagner 
2012:101). 
Admiral Andrews would wait until April 1943, this time, throwing every shred of 
evidence he had to support the removal of the minefield. In this brief, Andrews noted the lack of 
merchant vessel attacks since 15 July 1942 as well as the effect on local fishing which was 
“based on the Department of the Interior’s Deputy Coordinator of Fisheries stating that 
restrictions on fisherman in the area had already decreased the catch by a staggering 80,000,000 
pounds” (ESF 1943:11; Andrews in Wagner 2012:101). Finally, on 21 April 1943, Admiral King 
allowed the deconstruction of Cape Hatteras Minefield. However, this was left entirely to the 
Fifth Naval District, who while battling mechanical malfunctions and heavy weather only 
recovered 1,303 of the 2,500 mines. The danger of the remaining mines is why today the area is 
still labeled as a “Danger Area” (Figure 16). 
  
FIGURE 16.  Modern day chart, showing that the area is still considered dangerous due to “residual danger from 




Even with the job incomplete, the Fifth Naval District considered the removal a success, 
and the Navy moved on from Cape Hatteras. The event of historic ordnance washing on shore is 
not an uncommon phenomenon and is an issue that is always swiftly handled by military 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians (R.G. Sprigg et al. 2001:A2).  Therefore, it is 
impossible to say in this work if there have been any mines from Cape Hatteras Minefield wash 
up on shore as the access to operational records is restricted and further historical/archival 
material is unknown. Similarly, to date, there have been no reports of any ships entering the 
marked danger area and striking any of the mines.  Now that the historical context has been set, 
the next chapter, theory, will discuss the theoretical framework of the project. This marks the 




CHAPTER THREE: Theory  
Introduction 
This chapter discusses several theories sourced from battlefield and historical 
archaeology that are used throughout this study. Battlefield archaeology is a component of the 
larger field of historical archaeology. Historical archaeology approaches not only helped to 
populate the data sets and maps that were used for the analysis but also served as a backdrop for 
the information that was provided by archaeological survey. While considered a weapons 
system, the minefield is also at its core a battlefield; therefore, this designation justifies the use of 
the structures of both battlefield archaeology in conjunction with the METT-T (Mission, Enemy, 
Terrain, Troops Available and Time) and KOCOA (Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, 
Cover and Concealment, Obstacles and Avenues of Approach) approaches that will be used 
throughout the study (and expanded below). Finally, theory pertaining to the use of Geographical 
Information Systems in archaeological research will be discussed in order to guide the creation 
of geospatially-rectified maps.  This will help ensure that the maps created are compatible and 
aid the analysis of Cape Hatteras Minefield.  
 
Historical Archaeology 
The use of historical archaeology was central to the completion of this project, as 
historical sources will take precedence over the sparsely available archaeological datasets. It 
served as an overarching framework, incorporating battlefield archaeology and two battlefield 
archaeological approaches: METT-T and KOCOA. In line with historical archaeology, in 
addition to archaeological evidence, historical documents viewed as artifacts are interpreted to 
“allow a more accurate and thus more useful drawing of testable hypotheses to better organize 
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the collection and analysis of new data” (Babits 1981:11). Effectively, this allows for a melding 
of the disciplines of history and archaeology in the way that helps answer the research questions 
and enables archival information found in libraries and archives using traditional historical 
research methods to be reconciled with the sparse archaeological data. 
 
Battlefield Archaeology 
Battlefield archaeology endeavors to bridge the gap between traditional military history 
and the social science of archaeology (Pollard et al. 2005:v).  This bridge can be built “where the 
archaeological record is viewed as an independent dataset that can be compared to historical 
documents, participant accounts, maps, and other sources to build a more complete and accurate 
picture of an event” (Scott et al. 2009:429).  As Phillip Freeman lays out in his work, “History, 
Archaeology and the Battle of Balaclava,” there are three distinct ways that an archaeologist can 
approach the analysis of a battlefield.  The first uses “archaeology to embellish the accepted 
story of events,” where “archaeology is used to clarify details or add to the historical framework” 
(Freeman 2007:149).  The second, employs archaeological work to “reconcile the problematic 
aspects of an engagement, or to correct conventional interpretations” (Freeman 2007:149).  The 
third and final way views archaeological data as a tool used to bolster the historical account 
when available sources do not exist.  These three basic tenants of battlefield archaeology mean 
well, but as Nathan Richards (et al. 2011:25; Richards in Bright 2012:31) point out, “without an 
explicit theoretical framework, study of battlefields seem to trend along the lines of 
antiquarianism or historical particularism.” Utilizing an approach like antiquarianism or 
historical particularism tends to lead the user to fetishize artifacts while reinforcing the dominant 
historical narrative or it simply will describe a battlefield while lacking analysis. Over time, and 
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thanks to contributions by Dean Snow (1981), Douglas Scott et al. (1989), Richard Fox and Scott 
(1991) and Carl Drexler (2009), methodical frameworks have been constructed, therefore 
allowing the user to venture beyond a simple description of a battle and make educated 
assumptions as to why and how these events took place. 
The implementation of a battlefield archaeology framework can have a major impact on 
the narrative of a historic site in that “the conception of a particular battlefield can be greatly 
enhanced and perhaps even altered in the light of material evidence” (Bright 2012:7). Such a 
framework also emphasizes that warfare, being a human social activity, are not random 
occurrences, but come with a set of socially constructed rules. Therefore the “actions of military 
units on a battlefield are based on the tactics of the prevailing military wisdom of the day” 
(Potter et al. 2000:13).  
Battlefield archaeological approaches usually share a belief in the underlying cultural 
constant, that “combatants fight as they are trained under the rules of that culture’s perception of 
warfare behavior.  Opposing combatant positions, movement, armament, and methods of warfare 
should be discernible” (Scott et al. 2009:433).  However, they also allow researchers to consider 
vast differences in military culture from the macro (country) to the micro (unit) level. These 
sentiments are crucial for understanding the strategic and tactical decisions of the United States 
Navy when implementing a naval minefield at Cape Hatteras.   
The analysis of the American warfighter outlined in this thesis seeks to follow the 
precedent set in the introduction of the book Fields of Conflict, which is to uncover and compare 
the behavioral tendencies and choices of Allied and Axis combatants operating along the North 
Carolina coast (Scott et al. 2009:1). This patterning of a combatant’s decision-making process 
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asserted by Scott et al.’s analysis is echoed in John Keegan’s (1976) theory of inherent military 
probability in which, 
By assuming soldiers performed on the battlefield in a manner 
consistent with their training, military historians could critically 
review battle accounts by visiting the battlefield and determining 
what course of action a trained soldier would have taken given the 
lay of the land (Keegan 1976:34; Keegan in Bright 2012:26). 
Maritime scholars may also extrapolate this understanding to naval battlefield landscapes 
through a modified version of the U.S. Army’s METT-T Theory (which will be discussed later in 
this chapter).  The patterning of shipwrecks, especially those that result from naval engagements 
offers a unique form of analysis. The idea of shipwreck distribution as a reflection of human 
behavior is a common idea in maritime archaeology. For example, Keith Muckelroy (1978:4) 
defined maritime archaeology as “the scientific study of the material remains of man [sic] and 
his activities on the sea […] for the insight they give into the people who made or use them,” and 
Richard Gould (1983c:105) has written that shipwrecks “provide the signatures of particular 
kinds of behaviors associated with such conflict if one is willing to examine the relationships that 
exist between behavior and material residues.” Augmented by research such as John 
Broadwater’s work on the Battle of Yorktown, present-day researchers can see how essential 
understanding the relationship between the naval battlefield elements, such as mine placement 
and land formation choices (such as the area off Cape Hatteras) contributes to judging whether 
ports were safe during wartime.  As Broadwater asserts, 
Analyzing naval engagements within the broad natural and cultural 
landscapes across which they took place and with respect to the historical 
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events that define them, imparts additional significance and meaning to 
the events and the natural contexts in which they occurred (Broadwater 
2010:177). 
 
Only by understanding the natural marine environment and the way organizations such as the 
U.S. Navy analyzed the natural landscape can researchers analyze the wartime effectiveness of 
places such as Cape Hatteras Minefield.   
A major flaw of using Battlefield Archaeological Theory in this thesis is the lack of 
ability to personally ground-truth the locations that were used in the analysis of Cape Hatteras 
Minefield.  Though information from other works were consulted such as Hoyt et al 2017. This 
would be closer to the particularistic approach of George F. Bass (1983:91-104; Bass in Bright 
2012:14), of which a specific, comprehensive study would be performed at each site with the 
focus being on the artifacts themselves.  In the case of this thesis, a particularistic approach was 
just not monetarily feasible at this time. To compound the issue, the monetary funding, staff, and 
time needed to study two large freight vessels and a tugboat at such a great length are outside the 
scope of this project.  The next step in the logical framework is to then take a generalist 
approach.  This approach, while not as site specific, as Larry Murphy (1983:67) claims, lends 
more to the analysis of human behavior which is more in line with this project’s goals. 
Another issue that may arise is that while historical records list the routes of the various 
convoy paths and the locations of sinking events, these cannot necessarily be verified through 
any archaeological survey performed by the author in the context of this study.  This is in part 
due to the nature of the ocean itself.  In the instance of terrestrial archaeology, heavily traveled 
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routes can often still be observed in the terrain and the density of artifact scatter can be used to 
determine the locations of encampments, troop movements, and battlefields (Babits 1998:12). 
The flow of ships does not leave these long-lasting pieces of evidence. Moreover, the final 
resting places of sunken vessels do not reflect the same geographical locations as their sinking 
events.  As observed by Muckelroy (1998:267) and Robert L. Gearhart (1998:291), this is due to 
the natural tendency of vessels and artifacts to drift and move as they sink, as opposed to sinking 
straight down.  For the GIS created for this thesis, both the historic wrecking event coordinates 
and the current resting locations of Chilore, Keshena, and F.W. Abrams will be interpolated to 
show the differences in location. 
An important distinction that needs to be drawn is that unlike traditional terrestrial 
battlefield archaeology projects where the battlefield represents the geographic location where 
two groups of combatants fought, this thesis is examining the geographic location of an area 
where armed combatants (German U-boats) attacked non-combatant merchants (Allied 
shipping).  Under normal circumstances, the comparison would be difficult. German U-boats 
would be expected to follow a set doctrine of movement while the Allied merchants would have 
more freedom when they traveled. However, this may be a null point in this case.  Wartime 
restrictions on sea travel and the mobilization and activation of the American Merchant Marine 
would suggest that the Allied shipping lanes would be highly regulated and follow a very similar 
doctrine to that of the American Navy (Blair 1996:446).  Of course, it may also be that the 
cultural differences between the U.S. Navy and the merchant marine created a mistrusting and 
therefore insubordinate environment. Moreover, it was not uncommon for retired and active duty 
naval officers to be present on the merchant shipping convoys (Freeman 1987:415). 
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 To fully decode defensive choices of the United States, offensive trends of German U-
boats, and the utilization of the North Carolina Coast as the field of battle, the METT-T system 
will be utilized (Table 1). METT-T as an interpretive framework aids in the identification of the 
mission of Cape Hatteras minefield; and helps delineate the purpose of the minefield in the 
greater context of the Battle of the Atlantic.  The time portion will also work to emphasize the 
dichotomy between the long static nature of the minefield and the ever-fluid environment of 
naval warfare.  Time available is often defined as “time-based on the tentative plan and any 
changes to the situation” (United States Army 1992: 2.8-2.9).  
This is an important consideration because the time often dictates what the truly available 
options are to a commander.  For instance, the German U-boats had already begun creating 
havoc on Allied merchant shipping before the United States entered the war.  This forced the 
United States to make quicker decisions. While the use of KOCOA will fulfill the 'Terrain' 
portion of METT-T,  this framework allows the battlefield itself to be viewed through a 
theoretical lens and aid the construction of a new combat narrative (Table 2). During wartime, 
naval escorts led convoys; this will allow their actions to be viewed through the lens of METT-T. 
Also as a military installation, Cape Hatteras Minefield was operated and patrolled by U.S. Navy 
vessels such as YP-389 and, therefore, merchant mariners’ movements within the minefield are 
also viewable through the lens of METT-T and KOCOA. This is due to the fact that at the time 






































































































































































































































Geographical Information Systems and Theory 
This thesis uses Geographic Information Systems data in the form of ESRI ArcMap to 
create georectified maps that show the locations of the various convoy routing lines, sites of U-
boat attacks, the location of Cape Hatteras Minefield, and define the locations of the 
archaeological sites of Chilore, F.W. Abrams, and Keshena (and areas with potentially remnant 
mines). Utilizing GIS is suited to creating visual representations of the amount of shipping that 
took place along the North Carolina coast during the Second World War, but also, allows for 
data to be subjected to geospatial analyses.  For this study, GIS will also facilitate a more 
detailed interpretation of the patterns of movement of Allied convoys and German U-boats 
relative to the static structure of the minefield. Each of these features will be created as separate 
maps and then overlaid on a single geospatial representation.  As Wagner (2010) points out, 
“[b]y creating multiple GIS layers, a researcher can present the attributes of the particular item 
being added to the dataset. GIS software thus […] digitally links locations and their attributes so 
that they can be displayed in maps and analyzed” (Wagner 2010:16).  What sets GIS apart from 
other databases is this ability to reconcile two distinct events spatially; this allows a researcher to 
contextualize archaeological sites spatially. Therefore, the archaeologist can analyze the spatial 
patterns of archaeological locations and events (Conolly and Lake 2006:3; Wagner 2010:16). 
The use of GIS comes with its own theoretical framework.  For instance, with space, 
there is a difference in what James Conolly and Mark Lake (2006) describe as the Absolute 
Concept and the Relative Concept. These terms are defined as, 
 
The Absolute Concept: “views space as a container of all material objects, which 
exists independently of any objects that might fill it” (Conolly and Lake 2006:3).  
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The Relative Concept: “views space as a positional quality of the world of 
material objects or events, from which it follows that, unlike in the absolute 
concept, it is impossible to envisage space in the absence of things” (Conolly and 
Lake 2006:3). 
 
Thus the absolute concept and the relative concepts are theories of how to conceptualize 
space. It is the process by which a researcher takes a theory of space and transforms it into visual 
representations that create spatial distinctions. For example, if a map of the minefield was drawn 
with no scale, in the relative concept, the minefield’s legs would appear close to each other but 
without any spatial data taken into account. They simply would exist relative to each other 
without consideration to space itself as a third factor.  If drawn using the absolute concept, the 
legs of the minefield would be drawn with respect to the spatial data separating them, effectively 
drawing the map to scale.  These are then projected into two widely used forms of how to view 
space known as Topology and Euclidean Geometry. Conolly and Lake (2006) mark the 
differences between the two as, 
 
Topology distinguishes spatial objects that should be considered different on 
account of the way in which they relate to their neighbors and, for that reason, it 
has a close affinity with the relative model of space.  For example, suppose an 
excavation plan were drawn on a rubber sheet, then topology is concerned with 
those aspects of the recorded features that remain invariant when the sheet is 
stretched or knotted, but not cut or folded.  These include stratigraphic relations 
46 
 
such as ‘contains’ and ‘abuts’, but not the areas covered by different deposits 
(Conolly and Lake 2006:4). 
 
Euclidean Geometry is the geometry that most of us are taught at school. Devised 
by Euclid around 300 BC, it is an example of a metric geometric, that is one 
which includes the concept of distance between points such that the distance from 
point A to point B is the same as that from B to A.  Euclidean geometry has long 
been associated with the absolute concept of space…Returning to the example of 
an excavation plan, Euclidean geometry allows one to measure the areas covered 
by different deposits as well as to state the stratigraphic relations between those 
deposits (Conolly and Lake 2006:4). 
 
Of these two, this thesis will use Euclidean Geometry as the ability to analyze the spatial relation 
between two distinct features is the crux of the analysis of this thesis. Euclidean Geometry is 
closely linked to the absolute concept of space as that it takes into account the spatial data 
between two objects and, like the aforementioned map drawn with the absolute concept will be 
more accurate and scaled in order for patterns to emerge.  As Conolly and Lake (2006) point out, 
Euclidean Geometry regarding GIS is more specific and therefore more accurate.  Conversely, 
Topology is closely linked with the relative concept of space and therefore would be akin to 
drawing an unscaled map. In general, archaeology is very concerned with the use of the most 
accurate forms of data, to better inform the analytical process. Thus it is clear that the use of 





 These theoretical frameworks of historical archaeology, battlefield archaeology, and GIS 
permeate the proceeding chapters. As a work of historical archaeology, this thesis will heavily 
rely on historical data to assist in the analysis of the minefield. Battlefield archaeology 
approaches (specifically the METT-T and KOCOA frameworks) will help to analyze the choice 
in the battlefield and therefore the decision to place the minefield in Cape Hatteras. Finally, GIS 
theory will serve as a guide for creating maps in order to display and analyze archaeological and 
historical datasets. In the next chapter, Methodology, GIS methodologies will take precedence as 
the use of ArcGIS and the processes of map creation will stand alongside historical archaeology 













CHAPTER FOUR: Methodology 
Introduction  
The methodology of this project lies in the amalgamation of both historical research and 
geospatial datasets to analyze the overall effectiveness of the minefield as a defensive structure.  
Both historical primary and secondary sources were consulted to understand the thoughts, 
actions, motives, and perception of the United States Navy and the German sailors involved in 
the conflict surrounding the minefield.  The intended goal of the work done from the geospatial 
standpoint was to take the historical information and past archaeological datasets like the ones 
used by John Bright and John Wagner and create a georectified examination of the minefield.  
This method took into account the strategic and tactical considerations within the Battle of the 
Atlantic off North Carolina’s coast during the Second World War. As mentioned in the chapter 
on theory, a generalist approach was taken and, therefore, the need for historical and GIS data 
was high.  As Conlin and Russell (2011:41) point out,  
 
Unlike terrestrial battlefields, remains from naval battlefields will not typically 
consist of individual artifacts distributed across a landscape. However, multi-
scalar analysis of individual site components and the site as a whole can 
illuminate the progress of the battle and be used to evaluate overall patterns. 
 
Therefore, several goals in researching this project needed to be met before analysis would be 
possible.  These include:  
49 
 
 Research and collection of historical data in order to establish a static timeline of Cape 
Hatteras Minefield and incidents that created its historically negative narrative. 
 Research and collection of historical data about the Battle of the Atlantic as a whole to 
contextually understand Cape Hatteras Minefield’s place within the prolonged 
engagement.  
 Collection of spatial data to (or “intending to”) determine historic attack locations as 
well as final resting places of Chilore, F.W. Abrams, and Keshena, as well as the extent 
of the minefield itself. 
 Collection of spatial data to determine the total amount of merchant shipping taking 
place during the time Cape Hatteras Minefield was operational. 
 Use of ArcGIS to input collected data points and create maps to serve as visual 




 While there are numerous works on the Battle of the Atlantic very few of them, actually 
contain any mention of the minefield.  A great deal of the preliminary work was spent scouring 
these works for any mention of the minefield and subsequently the best primary sources to use as 
support.  Many of these works gave excellent background sources for the Battle of the Atlantic 
as a whole. However, the three most comprehensive works that provided direction for primary 
source research were Robert Freeman’s The War Offshore 1942 (1987) which was an annotated 
reprint of the ESF War Diary, John Wagner’s “Waves of Carnage” (2010) and John Bright’s 
“The Last Ambush” (2012).  These three sources each contained a dedicated section on the 
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minefield with accompanying primary source material.  A benefit of “Waves of Carnage” 
(Wagner 2010) and “The Last Ambush” (Bright 2012), was that both were East Carolina 
University theses. This meant that there was access to the source materials they collected, these 
source collections have been curated by Dr. Nathan Richards who made them easily accessible. 
The main goals of historical research in this study included: 
 Collection of historical data pertaining to the operational timeline of Cape Hatteras 
Minefield. 
 Collection of historical data relating to the Battle of the Atlantic as a whole to 
contextually understand Cape Hatteras Minefield’s place within the continued 
engagement.  
 Collection of historical data pertaining to the wrecking events and descriptions of KS-
520, Chilore, F.W. Abrams, and Keshena. 
 Collection of historical maps to determine the spatial extent of the minefield.  
  
Secondary Sources 
 While primary sources are the gold standard for research, to contextually understand the 
Battle of the Atlantic secondary sources were initially consulted to fill in gaps.  There are a 
plethora of secondary sources that have compiled the historical narrative of the Battle of the 
Atlantic.  Thankfully having access to the East Carolina University Joyner Library was 
extremely beneficial as they possess a significant number of the secondary sources needed.  
Approaching secondary sources first accomplished two things.  First, it identified the utter lack 
of dedicated sources on Cape Hatteras Minefield.  The most comprehensive secondary sources 
that were found were the subsections in Wager (2010) and Bright (2012).  Second, the secondary 
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sources provided a direction in which to take the research of primary sources. For example, 
Bright (2012:48) included this chart “Listing of NARA Records Accessed during Historical Data 
Collection Phase” (Figure 17), which was one of the first indications that a trip to the National 
Archives Records Administration (NARA) was necessary.   
 




There was an expansive amount of scholarship dedicated to the study of the Battle of the 
Atlantic that was used to research this thesis (Bekker 1974; Middlebrook 1976; Hughes 1977; 
Hoyt 1978, 1984; Gentile 1989, 2005; Hickam 1989; Cheatham 1990, 1994; Gannon 1990, 2010; 
Rust 1991; Syrett 1994; Blair 1996, 1998; Groove 1997; Rayner 1999; Hauge 2000; Williams 
2003; White 2006; Brown 2007; Levine 2012). While the number of sources that offered 
information about the Battle of the Atlantic off the coast of North Carolina in great detail were 
much fewer (Hickam 1989; Gannon 1990; O’Neal 2001). These works were instrumental in 
setting up the contextual information that was used in the history chapter. 
In order to better understand the German U-boats and therefore their wartime strategies, 
several works were used (Wolfgang 1955; Cremer 1982; Hoyt 1987; Edwards 1999; Werner 
2002; Williamson 2006; Wiggins 2010). Unfortunately, throughout the course of research for 
this project, there were no dedicated sources pertaining to Cape Hatteras Minefield itself.  
Instead, information regarding the minefield was taken from the small sections from works 
mentioned in this chapter but was mainly pieced together from primary sources.  Fortunately, 
John Wagner’s “Waves of Carnage: A Historical, Archaeological, and Geographical Study of the 
Battle of the Atlantic in North Carolina Waters” (2010) and John Bright’s “The Final Ambush: 
An Adapted Battlefield Analysis of the U-576 Attack upon Allied Convoy KS-520 off Cape 
Hatteras during the Second World War” (2012) focus directly on the Battle of the Atlantic in 
North Carolina waters.   
To understand both the way in which the U.S. Mark VI mine worked and the theory 
behind the construction of the minefield, this thesis examined several sources (Bureau of Navy 
Personnel 1955; Cook and Stevenson 1978; Friedman 1982; Melia 1987; Levie 1992; Koburger 
1994; Busuttil 1998; House 2001; Naval Studies Board 2001; Conlin and Russell 2006). Several 
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studies were essential to understanding different theories that are being utilized.  For battlefield 
archaeology, there were a number of main sources that were used (Freeman and Pollard 2011; 
Carret et al. 2002; Sutherland and Holst 2005; Conlin and Russell 2006).  For the theory 
supporting Geographic Information System use in archaeology and history, Past Time, Past 
Place: GIS for History (Knowles 2002) and Geographic Information Systems in Archaeology 
(Conolly and Lake 2006) were heavily used for the way in which ArcGIS was integrated into this 
thesis.  To better understand the application of ArcGIS specifically for the purpose of modeling 
battlefield landscapes and Cape Hatteras Minefield, Stephen Sanchagrin’s “A View Through the 
Periscope: Advanced and Geospatial Visualization of Naval Battlefields” (2013) was used as a 
guiding example.  For both a mix of battlefield and historic archaeology, Method and Topic in 
the Historical Archaeology of Military Sites (2010) compiled by Dr. Clarence Geier, Dr. 
Lawrence Babits, Dr. Douglas Scott and Dr. David Orr, was consulted, as well as some of Dr. 
Babits’ sole-authored works (Babits 1981, 2001a, 2001b, 2010a, 2010b).  Information for the use 
of METT-T and KOCOA was beneficial to understand the way these guidelines can be deployed 
in a maritime battlefield as maritime battlefields are a great deal more ephemeral than terrestrial 
sites (Potter 2000; Scott et al. 2009; Babits 2010; Bright 2012). 
A majority of this project depended on the reconstruction of the narrative surrounding the 
minefield, which was accomplished through the analysis of primary and secondary historical 
documents.  Many of the secondary source information was available through East Carolina 
University’s Joyner Library as well as through Interlibrary Loan. The focus was principally on 
primary source documents, such as United States Navy and Coast Guard reports, local and state 
economic records, merchant shipping lane catalogs, and U-boat ship-logs.  The interpretation of 
these documents was invaluable in constructing the analysis of the minefield. 
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 Trips to the National Archives in Washington DC. were vital to uncovering both the 
records of the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy since both played a role in 
the construction and maintenance of the minefield.  The United States Naval Archive records 
containing information about merchant convoys were heavily used in the construction of new 
datasets. Holdings in Record Group (RG) 26 contain information regarding distressed ships and 
the aid rendered to them and merchant logs.  Additionally, in College Park, Maryland at National 
Archives II there were several important sources.  These included: RG 19 The Bureau of Ships, 
RG 24 Naval Personnel Records, RG 38 Chief of Naval Operations, RG 74 The Bureau of 
Ordnance and RG 181 Naval Districts and Shore Installations.  The Naval History and Heritage 
Command staff and the archives housed there were consulted, specifically for their collection of 
translated logs from German U-boats.  These were not as instrumental in discovering if the 
German U-boats were aware of the defensive wall of mines or avoided it by chance as initially 
thought.  The Naval History and Heritage Command archives were also searched for the 
personnel and ship files for the minelayers Miantonomoh and USS Wassuc as these two vessels 
were essential in the construction of Cape Hatteras Minefield (Mooney 1991:483).  These were 
not as fruitful as initially believed.   
 
Numerical Data Collection  
 As a major cornerstone of this project’s scope, the collection of numeric and statistical, 
data was taken extremely seriously. To populate the graphs and charts in the next chapter with 
statistics such as; lives lost, ships lost, tonnage lost, cargo type and the amount and the cost of 
that cargo several primary and reputable secondary sources were used. It was important for these 
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sources to be as reputable as possible to produce the most accurate representation of Cape 
Hatteras Minefield.  
 In order to populate the statistics for the lives lost, ships lost, and date lost off the North 
Carolina coast during the Battle of the Atlantic several works were extremely beneficial 
(Freeman 1987; Wagner 2010; Bright 2012; Hoyt et al. 2017). After compiling a Microsoft Excel 
Spreadsheet of the ships lost and lives lost, the next step was to add the tonnage statistic for each 
of the merchant ships as well as the cargo each carried (Lloyd’s 1989; Browning 1996).  
Once these steps were completed, the most intensive part of the numeric collection came 
from the amassing of 1942 bulk cargo prices to visualize the monetary value of the shipment lost 
during the battle. Several sources were needed to cover the diverse types of cargo that the 
merchant ships carried (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1942; Mansfield 1942; U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1943; Mechler 1943; U.S. Department of Commerce 1944, 1949). This data 
collection was made even harder by some of the cargo descriptions being “General Supplies” or 
“General Army Supplies” Furthermore prices for items like “Explosives” and “Citrus Pulp” 
could not be located. 
 
Geospatial Information 
As there was no field component to this project, part of the methodology was based on 
viewing the historical documents as artifacts and analyzing datasets from prior works.  
Therefore, the role of GIS became crucial, as it formed the framework for analysis using ESRI’s 
ArcMap 10.1.3.  In order to expand the knowledge of the battlefield and to translate the maritime 
terrain into usable data, a geospatially rectified map of the minefield from historical documents 
was built. First, a basemap, the georectified map of the United States used as the foundation for 
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the maps was pulled from Global Administrative Areas (GADM). The next layers, historical 
maps, and charts showing the minefield were rubbersheeted and georectified, they were added as 
a layer. Rubbersheeting is the process by which a non-georectified image of a map can be 
inserted into ArcMap and then georectified through the matching of reference points on the 
basemap and map image.  The route trajectories for the wrecking events of Keshena, F.W 
Abrams, and Chilore, were populated from information collected by John Wagner in his work. 
The maps also included a layer depicting the locations of major World War II shipwrecks 
at the hands of U-boats before and after the implementation of the minefield to ascertain if the 
minefield had any effect on how the U-boats operated.  These locations were ascertained from 
historical documents from RG26 as well as archaeological data from NOAA. While these 
historical sources were important, the most valuable source for finding the accurate locations 
came from Hoyt et al. Battle of the Atlantic: A Catalog of Shipwrecks off North Carolina’s Coast 
from the Second World War (2017). A separate geospatial layer highlighted the major convoy 
trajectories before and after the implementation of the minefield to show the volume of shipping 
that passed without incident.  This process was similar to several of the geospatial maps created 
by Stephen Sanchagrin in “A View through the Periscope: Advanced and Geospatial 
Visualization of Naval Battlefields” (2013) (Figure 18). Other spatial datasets were consulted for 
specific convoys, John Bright’s “The Final Ambush: An Adapted Battlefield Analysis of the U-
576 Attack upon Allied Convoy KS-520 off Cape Hatteras during the Second World War” 





FIGURE 18. Digitized convoy routes meant to illustrate the differences in route reporting by individual vessels 
(Source: Sanchagrin 2013:94). 
FIGURE 19. Chart depicting major military installments located at Cape Hatteras as well as major convoy routes 




In order to successfully generate spatially rectified maps for this project, the ESRI 
ArcGIS 10.3.1 program was used. This multistep process will be detailed below. For many of the 
maps used in this project, the practice of rubbersheeting was used.  This process involves taking 
a reasonably accurate historical map and fixing it to a georectified base map in order to ascertain 
the spatial extent of the historical map’s content. The map featured below will serve as the 
example of how this process is performed (Figure 20). 
During the historical research portion of this project, several U.S. Navy maps were found 
depicting the arms of the minefield along the coast of North Carolina (Figure 21).  The inclusion 
of the coastline, drawn with relative accuracy made it an effective choice for rubbersheeting 
detailed outlines of the United States. 
  





The base map that was used for this map was sourced from NOAA and can be found in 
their geodata catalog, the most current version at the time of this writing is 11 August 2016. It is 
important to note that this base map uses the NAD 1983 datum and therefore all of the geodata in 
this project uses that projection. After the base map had been set, the historical map was put 
through Microsoft Illustrator in order to change the background color from tan to white for easier 
use (Figure 22).  Once this was completed, the historical map was inserted into ArcMap 10.3.1 
(Figure 23). The next step involved the use of the Georeferencing toolbox. The functions 
contained within the Georeferencing toolbox perform the actual operation of rubbersheeting. 
FIGURE 21. Confidential Section of USC&GS Chart 1232 showing the location and configuration of the Hatteras 



























































FIGURE 22. Basemap of the United States of America, GIS data provided by GADM (Created by Mitchell Freitas). 
FIGURE 23. Image depicting the process of rubbersheeting, in this step the non-georectified image has be inserted 
into the ArcMap workspace (Created by Mitchell Freitas). 
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The program allows the user to mark a reference point on an inserted image and then 
place a second reference point on the base map. After this is completed, the historical map is 
moved so that the two reference points are placed on top of each other.  The more distinct points 
that user chooses, the more the map is shaped to fit the base map. It is important to balance the 
distance between the points and the number of points themselves so that the historical map does 
not become warped. If the points are placed correctly, the map should appear as it does in Figure 
24. Once the rubbersheeting step has been completed, the shapes and drawing tools were used to 
trace the outlines of the minefields legs in order to project them as polygons on the map (Figure 
25). At this point in the process, the user now has a fully georectified map of the subject field, in 
this case, Cape Hatteras Minefield. In order for the magnified view to be implemented the user 
must copy the map to the clipboard and then paste it into the data frame. From here the map is 




FIGURE 24. Image depicting the product of rubbersheeting. Notice the red and green colored crosses, these 





Very similar processes are completed for the several other maps that were created for this 
project, these will be included and described in the next chapter, Results. The final chapter, 
Analysis, will detail how the historical data collection and the creation of the maps can be 






FIGURE 25. Map depicting the polygons that were overlaid on the historic map, leaving a clear representation of 
the minefield (Created by Mitchell Freitas). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Results 
Introduction 
 After collecting both historical and geospatial data, the next step was to augment the raw 
data into visualizations. This chapter serves to project these as raw datasets, devoid of the 
analytical lens that will be applied in the next chapter. A major cornerstone of not only the 
structure of this chapter but how the maps and charts pictured below are categorized, is by the 
temporal division of the Battle of the Atlantic. The first category contains the Allied merchant 
sinkings and the relevant numerical data such as the attack on convoy KS-520 that took place in 
the time before Cape Hatteras Minefield was active and will be labeled as the “Pre-Minefield 
Period.” The second,  “Active-Minefield Period” contains the minefield-specific data as well as 
the maps and numerical data for the events that took place while the minefield was active. 
Finally, the third category, “Post-Minefield Period” contains those maps and data that are 
relevant to the period after the minefield was deactivated.  To better understand the extents of the 
three periods, a timeline was created as a visual aid (Figure 26). 
The placement of the minefield off the coast of Cape Hatteras was extremely well 
calculated, as will be seen later in this chapter, the density of merchant sinkings in the area was 
extremely condensed. A major reason for this lies in the underwater terrain off the coast of North 
Carolina. The bathymetry naturally created a bottleneck that forced the Allied merchant convoys 
to travel close to shore in order to stay out of deeper waters. The limited range of air coverage 
exacerbated the bottleneck as well. All the while, the German U-boats could hide in the nearby 
deeper waters, avoiding detection by Allied escorts. This bottleneck is depicted in the North 
Carolina Coastal Bathymetry (Figure 27) map which shows the bathymetry represented by black 





Once the timeline was established, the next logical step was to create a geospatial 
representation of the minefield. This map creation was done through the process of 
rubbersheeting, the steps of which was detailed in the last chapter. This map allowed the scope 
and precise location of the minefield to be visually represented. Cape Hatteras Minefield map 
(Figure 28) depicts the location of the minefield relative to the Eastern Seaboard of the United 
States as well as a magnified view of the minefield’s layout.  In this view, the minefield’s legs, 
safe zone, swept channel, and the navigational boundary is highlighted.  It also depicts the range 
of the 36 miles of mines that were laid and how the minefield increased the profile of Cape 
Hatteras. This map largely served as the basis for the other maps that were created. 
FIGURE 26. Timeline depicting the lifespan of Cape Hatteras Minefield, from the preliminary meetings discussing 













 The Pre-Minefield Period contains relevant maps and numeric data pertaining to 
offensive actions by German U-boats off North Carolina during the Battle of the Atlantic. This 
section will break down the Pre-Minefield numeric and geospatial data that has been collected 
and created. 
 
Pre-Minefield Numeric Results 
 As with any wartime engagement, loss of life is a major factor in military planning. This 
issue is even more evident when the lives lost are those of noncombatant merchant sailors. The 
Pre-Minefield Period was a time of heavy loss of human life for the side of Allied merchant 
shipping. As can be seen in Pre-Minefield Allied Lives Lost Per Month (Figure 29) January 1942 
 
FIGURE 29. Chart depicting the lives lost during the Pre-Minefield Period by month, Total Lives Lost: 1206 
(Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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saw an immense amount of carnage, with the loss of 493 merchant sailors.  While the remaining 
months in the Pre-Minefield Period did not reach this height, the numbers were still reasonably 
large. In the month of February 1942, the North Carolina coast saw 149 lives lost. In March of 
1942, an upswing of 285 casualties occurred. In the following month, April, 270 merchant sailors 
perished while in May 1942 a massive drop occurred, and only nine lives were lost (Lloyds 
1989; Hoyt et al 2017). 
 The number of lives lost per month in this period does not correlate directly with the 
numbers of merchant ships lost per month. As can be seen in Pre-Minefield Allied Ships Lost Per 
Month (Figure 30) only nine ships were lost during January 1942, the month with the highest 
Allied ships lost at 24, the lives lost during this month are only a little over half of those lost in 
January. The division of numbers shows that catastrophic wrecking events took place in January 
and February due to a significant amount of casualties spread over such a small sample size 
(Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al 2017).  
 
FIGURE 30. Chart depicting the ships lost during the Pre-Minefield Period by month, Total Ships Lost: 60 (Source: 
Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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February of 1942 saw only eight ships lost but 149 lives lost. March 1942 however, was 
more along the lines of April, seeing 18 ships lost with the unfortunate number of 270 merchant 
lives lost. The entirety of both the lives lost and the ships lost trends can be viewed in the chart, 
Pre-Minefield Allied Lives and Ships Lost (Figure 31). The gray bars in this graph represent the 
Allied lives lost during the Pre-Minefield Period while the orange line represents the ships lost 
during this period. To allow for more detail, Pre-Minefield Lives Lost By Ship (Figure 32) breaks 
down the lives lost in each wrecking event by the ship lost. This graph once again represents the 
immense amount of ships lost during this period as well as highlights the enormous amount of 
destruction that the German U-boats inflicted on the Allied merchant shipping. It also reinforced 
that January 1942 was the worst month for casualties while April 1942 was the worst month for 
ships lost (Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al. 2017).  
 
 
FIGURE 31. This is a combination bar and line graph showing the direct correlation between the lives and ships lost 
during the Pre-Minefield Period, Total Lives Lost 1206 Total Ships Lost: 60 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 
Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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Another major consideration to factor into the loss of merchant vessels is the amount of 
tonnage lost and subsequently, the cargo lost. The amount of tonnage lost per ship is referenced 
in Pre-Minefield Allied Tonnage Lost By Ship (Figure 33).  As would be expected, given the 
sheer number of ships that were sunk during the Pre-Minefield Period the tonnage lost was 
extremely high. What is notable about this chart is that it shows the individual ships that were 
lost with their tonnage statistic. This chart indicates that each ship lost was statistically relevant 
and that the large overall number of total tonnage lost at 381,742 tons was not only due to the 
large sample size. For example, the smallest ship, the Norwegian merchant vessel Leif, displaced 
1,582 tons and carried 2,300 tons of general supplies while the largest the Swedish merchant 
vessel Amerikaland displaced 15,355 tons (Lloyd’s 1989:345,360). The average size of a ship 
lost during this period was 6,289 tons per ship; this would be considered a substantially sized 
merchant ship. These successful U-boat attacks took a massive toll on the merchant shipping 
efforts during this period (Lloyd’s 1989). 
While the ship itself is a highly vital piece of equipment, especially during the Battle of 
the Atlantic where the need for seaworthy vessels far exceeded the supply that was available, 
many of these merchant ships sank with vital wartime supplies. Not only were the Allies losing a 
ship that could take years to replace, but the warfront and America’s allies were also then 
suffering from the need of the supplies lost. These losses can be seen in Pre-Minefield Cargo 
Lost (Figure 34). Each cargo item lost is designated as either being measured as barrel or ton. As 
can be seen, a colossal amount of crude oil barrels were lost during the Pre-Minefield Period; 
this was due to a significant number of the ships sank being oil tankers. These numbers will be 
compared to those from the other time periods in the next chapter to better highlight the 




FIGURE 32. Bar graph representing the lives lost by ship, broken down by month, Total Lives Lost: 1204 (Source: 




FIGURE 33. Graph showing the tonnage lost per ship during the Pre-Minefield Period, Total Tonnage Lost: 




FIGURE 34. Graph breaking down the type and amount of cargo lost during the Pre-Minefield Period. Notice the 
amounts are either Barrels or Tons (Source: Lloyd’s 1989, Created by Mitchell Freitas).  
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Pre-Minefield Geospatial Results 
 A majority of the work done for this project rests in the geospatial products that are to 
follow. After using the processes outlined in the Methodology chapter, the data has been 
augmented to allow patterns to emerge as well as to convey geospatial data to the reader. There 
are three versions of the Pre-Minefield map, each of which contains its own set of analytical 
processes, and each of which will play a significant role in the next chapter. These maps include 
sinking locations, sinking site density, and a convex hull analysis. 
As can be seen in the Pre-Minefield Sinkings map (Figure 35), the visual representation 
of the charts in the previous section highlight the vast number of sinkings that took place prior to 
the implementation of the minefield. Shown in the main view of Pre-Minefield Sinkings are the 
losses that occurred within the present-day Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while the view 
within the magnified view box depicts those that took place outside the EEZ. The red diamonds 
represent an individual merchant vessel sinking, and each is labeled with the vessel name. Also 
included is the future location of Cape Hatteras Minefield which is indicated by the yellow 
outline. From this, it is easy to highlight the significant number of sinkings that took place in the 
immediate area of the future minefield.  
To further expand upon the density of ships lost around the location of the minefield, a 
density geoprocessing tool was used in order to show the areas off the North Carolina coast 
where the largest number of losses took place. In the map, Pre-Minefield Sinking Density (Figure 
36) red denotes the areas of the highest concentration of sunk merchant ships, yellow denotes the 
area of modest numbers, and green represents the area where no sinkings took place. As can be 

























































the minefield. This patterning played a significant role in the placement choice of Cape Hatteras 
Minefield and will provide major insight in the next chapter when viewing the wartime statistics 
as part of the overall analysis of the minefield.  
The final map type depicts the Pre-Minefield Period subjected to a convex hull analysis. 
These maps calculate the smallest amount of space needed to include all the entered points, and 
thus the ever-changing size of the naval battlefield can be tracked. In this case, geospatial points 
of the merchant ships that were sunk were subjected to the convex geoprocessing tool. In the 
Pre-Minefield Convex Hull map (Figure 37) this area is represented by a purple polygon and 
occupies 228,472 square miles. The immense extent of the area that the battlefield covers can be 
seen on the map as the polygon takes up nearly the entirety of the North Carolina coastline and 
extends out well past the EEZ. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, the area of the battleground 
was constantly changing; this is typical of naval battles which are archetypally more fluid than 
their terrestrial counterparts.  
Understanding the extent of the battlefield in each phase of the minefield’s lifespan not 
only shows how the battle progressed over time but also allows the analysis of defense system 
placements. In the later sections of this chapter, the change in the convex hull polygon will be 
extremely evident, allowing for a comparison to the other time period’s battlefield extends in the 
next chapter. This information along with the data from the Pre-Minefield Sinking Density 
become incredibly important in analyzing the placement of Cape Hatteras Minefield as an 





FIGURE 36. Pre-Minefield Sinkings Density, January 1942-May 1942 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 









 The numeric and geospatial results used to analyze the Active-Minefield Period include 
those sinkings and events that took place during the time in which the minefield was fully 
operational. Similar to the section above, the numeric results will show the breakdown of 
wrecks, including their locations, the lives lost per month as well as the tonnage and value per 
month. As this section deals with the minefield itself, greater detail will be paid to the wrecks 
directly associated with the minefield, namely F.W. Abrams, Chilore and Keshena. This section 
also deals with the German U-boat U-576’s attack on the Allied merchant convoy KS-520, and 
therefore the relevant numeric and geospatial data will be included as well. 
 
Active Minefield Numeric Results 
 Beginning again with the lives lost during this period, the most obvious trend in the 
Active-Minefield Allied Lives Lost Per Month chart (Figure 38) is the lack of lives lost between 
August 1942 and March 1943. This gap leaves the epicenter of activity during this period in the 
months of June and July of 1942. It is important to note that the convoy system was already 
being implemented during the same period that Cape Hatteras Minefield was active. As will be 
seen, the attack on Convoy KS-520 and the subsequent after-action reactions were responsible 
for the majority of attacks in July. During the month of June 1942 the overall trend of a reduced 
amount of lives lost continued with 12 lives lost, while the following month, July 1943 only saw 
13 lives lost (Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al. 2017). 
 The Active-Minefield Allied Ships Lost Per Month chart (Figure 39) looks remarkably 
like the Active-Minefield Allied Lives Lost Per Month chart, this is due to the fact that all 
sinkings during the Active-Minefield Period occurred between to June and July 1942. The ships 
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lost during June 1942 totaled nine, while the ships sunk during July totaled five. As before, these 
numeric datasets can be seen overlaid in the Active-Minefield Lives, and Ships Lost graph (Figure 
40). Just as in the last section, the gray bars signify the Allied merchant sailors that were lost 
while the orange line charts the ships that were lost. Moving to the more detailed view, Active-
Minefield Allied Lives Lost by Ship (Figure 41) lists the ships lost by name. Within this dataset, 
are the sinkings that have been directly associated with the minefield. These sinkings span the 
two active months, though majority take place in July 1942 as they are associated either directly 
or indirectly with the KS-520 Convoy attack. The breakdown of minefield associated sinkings 
and lives lost can be seen in Minefield Associated Lives and Ships Lost (Figure 42), there are 
only three ships whose sinkings were attributed to the minefield (Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al. 2017). 
 
FIGURE 38. Graph showing the Allied lives lost per month during the Active-Minefield Period, Total Lives Lost: 





FIGURE 40. This is a combination bar and line graph showing the direct correlation between the lives and ships lost 
during the Intra-Minefield Period, Total Lives Lost: 25, Total Ships Lost: 14 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 
Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
FIGURE 39. Graph showing the Allied merchant ships lost per month during the Active-Minefield Period, Total 
Ships Lost: 14 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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FIGURE 41. Amount of Allied lives per each individual wrecking event, broken down by the month they were lost 
during the Active-Minefield Period, Total Lives Lost: 25 (Source: Lloyd’s 1989, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 




The first happened in June and can be seen in Figure 41 listed as F.W. Abrams. The 
remaining two wrecks were lost in July of 1942. Before going any further, it is important to 
mention that J.A. Mowinckel was ultimately repaired and returned to service and therefore was 
not counted among vessels lost due to the minefield. This vessel was only included in these 
statistics due to its association with the minefield and KS-520. The tonnage lost during the 
Active-Minefield Period can be seen in the graph Active-Minefield Tonnage Lost by Ship (Figure 
43), which totals to 84,633 tons lost (Lloyd’s 1989). This tonnage is spread over 13 vessels, 
though not all of them were merchant vessels. For instance, the smallest vessel lost during this 
FIGURE 42. This is a combination bar and line graph showing the direct correlation between the lives and ships lost 
during the operation of the minefield while being directly associated with the minefield, Total Ships Lost: 3 Total 
Lives Lost: 2 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). Note: J.A. Mowinckel was not included 
in this count as it was repaired and put into service 12 March 1943. 
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period was the tug Keshena, which was sunk attempting to rescue the vessels that fled the attack 
on Convoy KS-520. Keshena only displaced 427 tons (Lloyd’s 1989:494). While there was no 
cargo lost, two sailors lives were lost after the ship struck a mine in Cape Hatteras Minefield. 
This loss is in stark contrast to the American oil tanker William Rockefeller. This tanker 
displaced 14,054 tons and carried a startling 135,000 barrels of fuel oil (Lloyd’s 1989:475). The 
remaining ships sank during this period average out to 5,465 tons per ship lost. As mentioned in 
the previous section, this would represent decently sized merchant vessel, however, in this 
section, this figure was only extrapolated over 11 ships.  
The cargo lost during the Active-Minefield Period also reflects the declining nature of 
attacks. As can be seen in Active-Minefield Allied Cargo Lost (Figure 44) the loss of barrels of 
fuel oil was paramount during this period with 228,250 barrels being lost. In comparison to the 
fuel oil, the barrels of dirty oil lost severely drops off where only 14,000 barrels of dirty oil were 
lost. Surprisingly the third highest amount of cargo lost during this period was 10,600 tons of 
sugar. As can be seen, the diversity of the class of freight lost has been severely diminished. 
Therefore, the cost comparison discussed in the next chapter highlights the stark differences 






FIGURE 43. Amount of Allied tonnage lost by ship during the Active-Minefield Period, Total Tonnage Lost: 84,633 
Tons (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
86 
   
FIGURE 44. Amount and type of cargo lost during the Active-Minefield Period, notice that the amounts are either 
in barrels or tons (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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Active-Minefield Geospatial Results 
  Before discussing the wrecks involved with the KS-520 Convoy attack, an overall view 
of the sinkings is necessary to provide context.  Notice in the Active-Minefield Sinkings map 
(Figure 45) that the blue circles depict the associated minefield sinkings, while the red squares 
represent the other non-minefield associated sinkings that occurred. As seen previously, a 
recessed view shows the wrecks that took place outside of the EEZ. As per the first section, the 
Active-Minefield Density (Figure 46) shows the hotspots of sinking activity during the time the 
minefield was active. The next map, the Active-Minefield Convex Hull (Figure 47) shows the 
battlefield area of the Active-Minefield Period. In this map, the sinking points that were 
associated with the minefield are group under the orange, convex hull polygon, which occupies 
249 square miles, while the points that were sunk by other causes are covered by a red polygon 
covering 28,406 square miles in area. 
 The next map, the Attack of Convoy KS-520 (Figure 48), plays host to a plethora of 
elements.  It is important to point out the bold red line and yellow-black checkered line as they 
depict the two accepted navigational routes for merchant ships.  The bold red line is the route 
dedicated to the merchant ships traveling as individuals. This route directed the merchant ships 
closer to the coastline for protection and made use of Cape Hatteras Minefield as a waypoint. 
The yellow-black checkered line depicts the path for convoys. As shown, the convoy route is 
further out to sea and bypasses the minefield altogether.  
The main elements of the attack are depicted, including the convoy itself, as the cluster of 
yellow diamonds. The convoy escorts are represented by green squares, the aerial escorts as 























































FIGURE 46. Intra-Minefield Sinking Density, May 1942-April 1943 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 









FIGURE 48. Attack of Convoy KS-520, 15 July 1942 (Source: Wagner 2012: Data Files, Created by: Mitchell 
Freitas 2016).  Note: Shipwreck locations are historical interpretations by Wagner. 
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The positions of the various ships and aircraft are depicted at the time of the attack. The green 
and blue lines show the routes and reactions of the merchant ships Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel, 
which were members of the KS-520 convoy and were part of the group led by the U.S. Naval 
escort ship USS Spry back into the depths of Cape Hatteras Minefield. Finally, the black dotted 
line denotes the distance of 10 miles, and highlights the difference in distance between the 
individual and convoy routing lines; this distance between the two routes will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
The next two maps in this section depict the routes taken by the Allied merchant ships 
Chilore (Figure 49) and J.A. Mowinckel (Figure 50). Both ships were part of the ill-fated Convoy 
KS-520, and it follows each ship’s progress, starting at the teal octagon. This, however, is simply 
the the extent of the geospatial data available, the true starting point of Convoy KS-520’s was 
from a shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia (Freeman 1987:411). This port is denoted by a blue 
rectangle emblazed with an anchor.  From there, the map depicts the two ships’ route down the 
coastline until the attack by U-576 occurs. The attack is denoted by the red asterisks that appear 
on both maps. From the offensive zone, the sharp angle inland shows the attempted flee to safety 
that was led by USS Spry, and the party’s general location of contact with mines from Cape 
Hatteras Minefield. Following the interaction with mines and the unfortunate sinking of the tug 
Keshena, the routes show the two merchant ships towing back to Norfolk, Virginia.   
The major difference between the two maps lies in the ending positions of the merchant 
ships. While still attributed to the minefield, the final resting place of Chilore is just off the coast 
of Cape Henry in Virginia. After Chilore well along the way back to Norfolk the ship foundered 
and finally sank (Freeman 1987:419). In comparison, the Final Route of J.A. Mowinckel map 









FIGURE 50. Final Route of J.A. Mowinckel (Source: Wagner 2012: Data Files; Hoyt et al 2017, Created by: 




 This section contains the results pertaining to the period after the minefield was 
deconstructed and rendered safe to the standard of the navy at the time. Unlike the two preceding 
sections, this section does not boast nearly as much data. While the products included are similar, 
it will become readily apparent that there is less detail shown in these data products. This lack of 
information does not mean that patterning cannot be seen. The data in this section will serve as 
valuable comparative information relative to the previous two time periods in the next chapter. 
 
Post-Minefield Numeric Results 
 While containing the fewest results, the temporal length of this period dwarfs the prior 
two sections. Beginning in April of 1943, this period would stretch to the end of the battle in 
April 1945. As can be seen in Post-Minefield Allied Lives Lost Per Month (Figure 51), the Allied
 
FIGURE 51. Lives lost during the Post-Minefield Period broken down by month, Total Lives Lost: 27 (Source: 
Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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lives lost had decreased dramatically with the exception of December of 1943 when the wrecking 
event of Libertad killed 24 merchant sailors, but this is atypical for this dataset. The remaining 
sinkings produced two dead in May of 1943 with the wrecking of Panam and one life lost during 
the sinking of Belgian Airman (Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al 2017).  
Even more sparsely populated is the Post-Minefield Allied Ships Lost Per Month graph 
(Figure 52). With the sinking of Santa Catalina in April 1943 and Panam in May of 1943, it 
would be another seven months without the sinking of an Allied merchant ship off the coast of 
North Carolina. December 1943 saw the sinking of Libertad, the last ship sunk for another 15 
months with the final sinking of the conflict, Belgian Airman, in April of 1945. There is a host of 
reasons why this wind down occurred. However, these will be further explored in the following 
chapter. The next two figures emulate these two datasets together each in varying detail. The 
first, Post-Minefield Lives and Ships Lost (Figure 53), shows the ships lost per month with the 
lives lost per month superimposed over the top. The next graph, Post-Minefield Allied Lives Lost 
By Ship (Figure 54), shows the four ships by name and their resulting casualties, this is then split 
up by month (Lloyds 1989; Hoyt et al 2017).   
Following the prevailing trend of the Post-Minefield Period, the total amount of tonnage 
is severely diminished.  This reduction in tonnage lost can be directly attributed to the minuscule 
sample size of four merchant ships. While this section does not boast any large merchant vessels 
in the vicinity of Amerikaland or William Rockefeller, the ships lost were not of insignificant 
size. As it can be seen in Post-Minefield, Allied Tonnage Lost (Figure 55) the Panamanian tanker 





FIGURE 52. Allied ships lost per month during the Post-Minefield Period by month, Total Ships Lost:4 (Source: 
Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
 
FIGURE 53. This is a combination bar and line graph showing the direct correlation between the lives and ships lost 
during the Post-Minefield Period, Total Lives Lost 27 Total Ships Lost 4 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 




FIGURE 54. Lives lost per ship during the Post-Minefield Period broken down by the month in which the wrecking 
event occurred, Total Lives Lost:27 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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The smallest, the Cuban merchant Libertad, displaced 5,441 tons (Lloyd’s 1989:725). 
These numbers are comparable to the average ship sizes in both the Pre-Minefield Period and the 
Active-Minefield Period. The average tonnage displaced in this time period totals 6,733 tons, 
and, while this is the largest average of the three periods, it was only spread across two ships. 
The actual tonnage of the remaining two ships were 6,507 tons for the American merchant Santa 
Catalina and 6,959-ton Belgian merchant Belgian Airman (Lloyd’s 1989:644,804). 
 The cargo lost statistics during the Post-Minefield Period are even more meagerly 
populated than the ships lost. For this period, only two classes of cargo were lost in this case 
sugar and general supplies. These two cargo categories are reflected in Post-Minefield Allied 
Cargo Lost (Figure 56). In this period, 8,000 tons of sugar were lost, as well as 6,700 tons of 
general supplies (Lloyd’s 1989). These numbers reflect the diminishing nature of attacks that 
occurred during this period. The cost analysis in the next chapter will shed more light on the 






FIGURE 55. Amount of Allied merchant tonnage sunk during the Post-Minefield Period by individual ship, Total 




FIGURE 56. Type and amount of cargo lost during the Post-Minefield Period (Source: Lloyd’s 1989, Created by: 
Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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Post-Minefield Geospatial Results 
The maps in this section mimic those above. However, the sparseness of the Post-
Minefield Period data above becomes even more apparent when putting into a visual 
representation. The map below, Post-Minefield Sinkings (Figure 57), shows the very few sinking 
points that occurred during the Post-Minefield Period. It becomes a common theme in this 
section that the fewer the data points entered, the product that is produced by the geoprocessing 
tools is much less detailed. This can certainly be seen in the Post-Minefield Density (Figure 58), 
where the range of color depicting density is much less detailed than the previous density maps. 
However, even after the minefield was removed, the results still show the heaviest density in red 
within the same area as the other maps. When comparing the Pre-Minefield and the Active-
Minefield maps with the Post-Minefield map, it is apparent that the density analysis tends to 
work better when more points are included as part of the algorithm. Even so, it is still evident 
that the concentration of shipwrecks is still located in the immediate vicinity of Cape Hatteras 
Minefield in the Post-Minefield Density map. 
The final map in the section is Cape Hatteras Minefield operational area subjected to the 
convex hull algorithm. In the map, Post-Minefield Convex Hull (Figure 59) the polygon 
represents the smallest amount of area between the four shipwrecks in the Post-Minefield Period, 
represented by red diamonds. In this iteration, the battlefield’s area is represented by a green 
triangle. This polygon represents 48,546 square miles and will serve as a better comparison in 




















As has been alluded to throughout this chapter, the next chapter, Analysis will be used to 
delve into these results. While this chapter listed and explained the various result products that 
were created, the Analysis chapter will stand as the final culmination of this work. It will use the 
products that were described in this chapter to draw conclusions about Cape Hatteras Minefield 
and its true effectiveness, as well as seek to answer the research questions listed at the start of 
this project. Both the numerical and geospatial data tabulated and mapped in this chapter will be 















CHAPTER SIX: Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter serves as a platform to answer the research questions posed at the beginning 
of this work. To reiterate, the overall goal of this project was to identify the ways in which a 
naval minefield could be adequately assessed using Cape Hatteras Minefield as a trial case. The 
first step in this chapter is to briefly reestablish the historical narrative of the minefield in order 
to set the baseline for the assessment. This will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. In 
the next section, the actual assessment will take place. Each of the evaluation quantifiers that 
make up the secondary research questions will be individually addressed. These quantifiers 
include losses to human life, economic losses, theoretical categorization of the minefield itself, 
and, finally, the assessment of protection offered by the minefield. Ultimately, these markers 
should successfully reassess Cape Hatteras Minefield as either a success or  
failure. 
The Traditional Narrative 
 As stated many times throughout this work, the opinion held by not only Admiral 
Andrews, but reflected in the sparse literature dedicated to the minefield is that Cape Hatteras 
Minefield was a total failure. Therefore, more of a hindrance than an aid against the German U-
boats. These arguments hinge on the number of ships lost in direct association with the 
minefield, as well as the impact of the minefield on local shipping (ESF 1942b; ESF 1943:8; 
Freeman 1987:415-419; Wagner 2012:100). 
 The principal argument against the minefield centers on the losses of Chilore, F.W. 
Abrams, and Keshena (Figure 60). Both F.W. Abrams and Chilore were substantially sized 
merchant ships, and, while Chilore was only carrying water ballast, F.W. Abrams was carrying 
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90,000 barrels of fuel oil (Lloyd’s 1989:458). This was an incredibly large cargo worth 
$215,100.00 in 1942, and subsequently $3,204,580.91 in 2017 (McMahon 2017). These losses 
are compounded with the unfortunate loss of life experienced during the wrecking event of 
Keshena. These losses were among the major evidence that Admiral Andrews brought to the 
attention of Admiral King with the suggestion to remove the minefield. Admiral King adamantly 
opposed the removal of the minefield, citing the inability of Cape Hatteras’ geography to support 
Admiral Andrews’ suggestion of torpedo nets as a defensive alternative.   
Throughout the life of the minefield, the theme of miscommunication was ever present. 
The loss of F.W. Abrams was due in large part to the fact that the merchant captains were not 
informed of the true danger of the minefield. After losing the naval escort leading the merchant 
vessel out of the minefield in a heavy storm, the captain of F.W. Abrams believed the ship could 
follow a course directly out to open sea. This decision resulted in the detonation of several mines 
and, subsequently, the loss of the ship itself (Freeman 1987:345; Wagner 2010:91; Bright 
2012:110). 
Following this unfortunate event, the next major wrecking event in the life of the 
minefield led to the loss of Chilore, Keshena, and the damaging of J.A. Mowinckel. The ill-fated 
convoy KS-520 left port at Lynnhaven Road, Virginia on 14 July 1942. At 19 merchant ships 
strong, the convoy escorts included two U.S. Coast Guard cutters, two U.S. Navy destroyers, one 
corvette, and two coastal patrol vessels. Two allied aircraft augmented this escort package. Even 
with a heavy defensive escort, U-576 still managed to ambush the convoy sinking Bluefields 
almost instantly and managing to damage both Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel. In order to protect 
the wounded ships, the escort ship Spry led the two ships towards what was thought to be the 
closest area of safety. Due to miscommunication on the part of LtCdr. Firth, in control of Spry, 
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FIGURE 60. Cape Hatteras Minefield 1942-1943 (Source: National Archives, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016).  
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and the Convoy Commodore Nichols, who was aboard J.A. Mowinckel, the three ships were set 
on a course directly into the minefield (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:412; Wagner 2012:98).  
After a series of ignored attempts by the minefield patrol vessels to ward off the ships, 
both Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel struck mines, halting their progress but remaining afloat. Spry 
was able to navigate out of the minefield to safety (ESF 1942b; ESF 1943:8; Freeman 1987:418; 
Wagner 2012:100). In response to these events, two tugs were dispatched to tow the two ships to 
safety It was at this point that the tug Keshena struck a mine and sank instantly. Thus, the 
minefield claimed its second victim (Standard Oil Company 1946:36; Bright 2012:151).. This 
incident was not the final loss attributed to the minefield. As Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel were 
being towed back to the shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia, Chilore would founder off Cape Henry 
and sink (SOC 1946:370-371; Bright 2012:152). These events are critical and serve as one of the 
cornerstones of Admiral Andrews’ argument against the minefield. It also was the only time that 
the convoy system and the minefield defense came into direct contact with one another, allowing 
for a direct comparison, which will take place in the next section.  
 Admiral Andrews also made the case that the minefield was causing an immense strain 
on the fishing economy of North Carolina. The statistic proffered by Admiral Andrews to 
Admiral King was that there was a decrease in 80,000,000 pounds of catch during the time that 
Cape Hatteras Minefield was active. This decline, Admiral Andrews asserted, was due to the 
inability of the fishing vessels to navigate near the minefield. The combination of the losses in 
ships and the effect on the local economy were enough to convince Admiral King to order the 
decommissioning of the minefield on 21 April 1943 (ESF 1943:11; Andrews in Wagner 
2012:101). In addition, these are the two reasons that carry the argument of the ineffectiveness of 
the minefield through to modern scholarship.  
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Reassessing Cape Hatteras Minefield 
 In the last chapter, each time period was presented independently and without significant 
commentary in order to avoid the formulation of premature conclusions. In this chapter, 
assessment markers will overlay the data from all three time periods in order to allow for direct 
comparison. The first section, Lives and Ships Lost, will compare the data from all three periods 
with a view to identify trends of the improvement or degradation of protection. Next, the 
Economic Losses including fishing statistics, cargo lost, and value lost will be matched across the 
time periods and compared. A portion of the theoretical framework includes an analysis of the 
minefield through the lens of METT-T and KOCOA which will help illustrate the minefield’s 
placement and the movement of the battlefield across the three periods. Finally, the survival and 
safety of the merchant ships will be compared across defense systems. 
 
Lives and Ships Lost 
The opening moves of the Battle of the Atlantic on the North Carolina coast from 18 
January 1942 to 26 May 1942 by German U-boats saw an immense strain put upon the Allied 
merchant shipping operation. During this time period, an astounding 1,204 merchant lives were 
lost from German U-boat attacks (Hoyt et al 2017). As can be seen in the Allied Lives Lost chart 
(Figure 61), the lives taken during the Pre-Minefield Period account for 96% of the total number 
of casualties on the North Carolina coast during the Battle of the Atlantic. Compared to the 
following periods, the improvement is exceptional. In the Active-Minefield Period, a significant 
drop in lives lost occurred whereas, in this period, the lives lost totaled 25 or 2%.  The Post-
Minefield Period touted similar numbers with 27 lives taken, also amounting to 2% of the total 







FIGURE 61. Pie chart that breaks down the lives lost during the Battle of the Atlantic in relation to the life of the 
minefield (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
FIGURE 62. Pie chart that breaks down the ships lost during the Battle of the Atlantic in relation to the life of the 
minefield (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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The patterns seen in the Allied lives lost are heavily echoed when considering the 
quantities of Allied ships lost. These patterns can be viewed in the Allied Ships Lost (Figure 62): 
the Pre-Minefield Period occupies the largest portion of the chart at 60 ships, or 77%, of the 
graph. Such a high number of casualties had to be spread over a large sample of ships. While still 
hosting more ships sunk than the Post-Minefield period, the Active-Minefield period saw 14 
ships sunk, making up 18% of 78 total ships sunk (Hoyt et al 2017). Finally, during the Post-
Minefield time period, only four ships were sunk, consisting of only 5% of the Allied Ships Lost 
chart. The early losses were a direct result of a lack of defensive planning at the beginning of the 
conflict. When considering the two datasets together, the disparaging gap between the Pre-
Minefield Period and the Active-Minefield Period becomes evident. As can be seen in Allied 
Lives and Ships Lost chart (Figure 63) the period corresponding with the installation of the 
minefield show the severe drop that is illustrated in the pie charts above (Figures 62 and 63). 
  
FIGURE 63. This combination bar and line graph shows the direct correlation between the lives and ships lost 
across all three time periods. Total Lives Lost: 1,256, Total Ships Lost:74 (Source: Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: 
Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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While the decreased ships and lives lost are direct evidence of the strengthening of the Allied 
defenses, it is not direct proof that the minefield was performing correctly. Proof of the 




 Now that the number of lives lost have been discussed, which arguably is the greatest loss 
from a social standpoint, the commodities that these ships were carrying will be analyzed. The 
ship tonnage and the tonnage of materials are arguably the most valuable commodities lost from 
a wartime aspect. The sinking of large ships represented damage to an already strained merchant 
fleet. The larger the ship, the longer it would take to replace. The loss of the ships comes with the 
compounded loss of mass amounts of materials that were supporting the war effort in Europe. 
The loss of cargo represented a substantial economic loss across all three time periods. 
 
TONNAGE LOST 
Without a doubt, there exists a major discrepancy between the Pre-Minefield Period and the  
following two periods. As can be seen in Allied Tonnage Sunk (Figure 64), the tonnage sunk 
during the Pre-Minefield Period is responsible for 78% of the total tonnage sunk during the 
engagement off the North Carolina coast at 381,742 tons. This loss is to be expected as the total 
number of ships sunk during the Pre-Minefield Period total a similar statistic. Moving to the 
Active-Minefield Period, the tonnage lost severely drops off, following the overall trend of the  
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engagement. With only 84,633 tons of merchant ships lost, it pales in comparison to the previous 
time period. Finally, the tonnage lost in the Post-Minefield Period occupies only 5% of the total 
chart with 26,184 tons lost. These statistics reinforce that the Pre-Minefield Period signified a 
time of immense violence aginst merchant shipping. From an economic standpoint, the 
significant amount of tonnage lost represented a colossal toll taken on shipping companies and 
wartime efforts. The statistical drop from the Pre-Minefield Period to the Active-Minefield 
Period shows that the Anti-Submarine efforts made by the U.S. Navy were beginning to take 
effect. The key here is to acknowledge that there were several different systems of Anti-
Submarine Warfare being employed, and, while Cape Hatteras Minefield cannot be solely 
credited with the drop in tonnage lost, there are no significant anomalies that show the minefield 
causing atypical harm.  
 
FIGURE 64. Pie chart showing the tonnage sunk, allowing a direct comparison between the Pre-Minefield, Active-




While the loss of the merchant ship itself was a blow to the Allies, each of the ships sunk 
was either transporting cargo or en route to acquire the cargo the merchant sailors were tasked to 
deliver. As will be seen in this section, the amount of freight lost represented a massive 
economic loss and would have had a profound effect upon both the warfront and the homefront. 
It is important to understand that the numbers featured in these charts are unfortunately and 
unavoidably incomplete. As shown in the last chapter, there were several cargo listings such as 
“General Army Supplies” whose values could not be ascertained. However, the data included 
does more than enough to project the patterns echoed throughout this chapter. 
In 1942 Value of Cargo Lost (Figure 65), a different pattern emerges compared to 
previous pie charts. In this purview, the Pre-Minefield Period only occupies 51% of the total 
value of cargo lost. In 1942, this was estimated at $3,061,827, however, as shown in 2017 Value 
 
FIGURE 65. Pie chart showing the value of cargo sunk across the three time periods, in this chart the amounts are in 
1942 American currency (Source: United States Department of Commerce 1942, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016 
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of Cargo Lost (Figure 66), in 2017 the total value of cargo lost would be $45,615,395 (adjusted 
for inflation). This is a substantial amount of capital lost during a time when rationing was 
already being implemented, and resources were already stretched thin. During the Active-
Minefield Period the value lost totals 37%, this meant the loss of $2,186,852 in 1942 
($32,579,941 in 2017). The reason for this change in patterning is due to the various costs 
associated with the commodities that were being carried by each ship. In Value of Cargo Lost By 
Commodity in 1942 (Figure 67), the Active-Minefield Period’s losses are represented by the 
orange bars showing that Fuel Oil, Sugar, and Flaxseed were amongst the highest total values 
lost. While the number of ships lost during the Post-Minefield Period as indicated was lower than 
the other two time periods, the much lower total value lost is due to the fact that only one of the 
four ships lost during the time period were carrying cargo whose values could be ascertained 
(Lloyds 1989; United States Department of Commerce 1942). 
 
FIGURE 66. Pie chart showing the value of cargo sunk across the three time periods, in this chart the amounts are in 




FIGURE 67. Bar graph showing type of commodity lost as well as the cost associated with each loss (Source: 




In Value of Cargo Lost (Figure 68), the values of each time-period in 2017 can be seen 
superimposed with their values in 1942. This group of graphs continues to show the increased 
amount of defense and protection implemented during the Active-Minefield Period (For a full 
price list see Appendix C). 
 
COMMERICAL FISHING 
While the cargo value lost has declined over this period, one of the major economic 
arguments against Cape Hatteras Minefield was the effect on the local commercial fishing. One 
of the central arguments that Admiral Andrews made to Admiral King while petitioning to have 
the minefield deactivated was the impact that it was having on the local commercial fishing 
numbers. Admiral Andrews cited an 80,000,000-pound decrease in North Carolina commercial 
fishing numbers following the implementation of the minefield (ESF 1943:11; Andrews in 
Wagner 2012:101). Admiral Andrews claimed that the damage to the local economy was too 
FIGURE 68. Combination bar and line graph comparing the amount of value lost in 1942 as well as 2017 across the 
three time periods (Source: United States Department of Commerce 1942, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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high to continue the minefield’s operation. The commercial fishing numbers are taken from the 
North Carolina Division of Fisheries charts, and represented in Total Poundage of Fish Caught 
off the North Carolina Coast (Figure 69) and Value of Fish Caught off the North Carolina Coast 
(Figure 70), which show the total numbers of pounds and value respectively from 1880 to 1971 
(Chestnut et al. 1975: 55). Unfortunately, a gap exists from 1941-1944. While not ideal, 
information can still be taken from the Divisions of Fisheries data. In these charts, major events 
taking place in the United States have been overlaid to show the effects of external events on 
North Carolina’s ability to maintain its commercial fishing numbers.   
As can be seen in the following two charts, the nature of commercial fishing in North 
Carolina was extremely elastic, and no long-term effects were suffered. In fact, it was quite the 
opposite; the fishing numbers exploded after the end of the war. This rebound is significant since 
the area occupied by the minefield was marked a navigational hazard and is still cordoned off for 
unrestricted surface navigation, but warns against floor disturbance in 2017. If the minefield was 
directly responsible for the drop-in fishing numbers, as opposed to the military engagement 
happening off of the North Carolina coast, the suppression of fisheries numbers would have 
continued to present day. There is also the consideration that during any type of homeland 
defense there will be strain and stress put on the local population to benefit their greater safety.  
As demonstrated in this section, Cape Hatteras Minefield, at best, could be considered as 
part of a greater system of coastal defenses that were proven effective by the statistical drop in 
lives, ships, tonnage, and cargo lost moving from the Pre-Minefield Period to the Active-
Minefield Period. At worst, there are no statistical irregularities that would point to the minefield 





FIGURE 69. The total pounds of fish commercially caught off the coast of North Carolina from 1880-1971, 
this is superimposed with major American events to show the effect they may have on the numbers 




FIGURE 70. The total value of fish commercially caught off the coast of North Carolina from 1880-1971, 
this is superimposed with major American events to show the effect they may have on the numbers 
(Source: Chestnut et al. 1975: 55, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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Safety and Security 
 The wrecking events that are associated directly with the minefield need to be assessed in 
order to determine if the minefield was at fault, and, if so, how or why the system broke down. 
The locations of the three wrecked ships are depicted in the map Minefield Associated Sinkings 
(Figure 71). This map is an important graphic as the final locations of the wrecks have 
significant implications for the assessment of the wrecking events. After these developments 
have been assessed, the minefield will then be compared to other defensive systems that were in 
place at the time. 
 
FIGURE 71. Cape Hatteras Minefield 1942-1943 depicting the minefield associated wrecks (Source: National 




The Wrecking Event of F.W. Abrams 
 To recap the events that led to the sinking of the oil tanker F.W. Abrams a timeline 
(Figure 72) has been created to highlight the major events leading up to the sinking quickly. For 
a more detailed, non-analytical account, please see page 8 in Chapter Two: History. The first 
significant event surrounding the sinking of F.W. Abrams occurs on 10 June 1942 when the 
merchant ship is successfully escorted into the minefield's harbor by the Coast Guard escort CG-
484. Safe passage through the minefield was regulated by the use of an escort ship since the 
escort ships were the only entities that had access to the locations of the swept channels. To 
reiterate a major point from Chapter Two: History, the merchant ships at this time were only 
FIGURE 72. Timeline briefly highlighting the major events leading to the wrecking event of F.W. Abrams 
deactivation (Source: Freeman 1987, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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given the knowledge that the geospatial extent of the minefield was a “Hazardous Navigation 
Area,” no information about the mines was disclosed ((Freeman 1987:343; Hickam 1996:275; 
Wagner 2012:91). 
 Moving to the next event, the breakdown in the standard operating procedure becomes 
readily apparent. On 11 June 1942, while F.W. Abrams was being escorted from the minefield, 
the two vessels were overtaken by extremely heavy downpours and fog. This sudden and violent 
weather made it impossible for the merchant vessel to make visual contact with the Coast Guard 
escort. The decision was made by Captain Anthony Coumelis to attempt a clean break to open 
waters believing that the navigational hazard was an overstatement. This choice was the ship’s 
undoing. Shortly after this choice was made, at 0650 EWT, the first mine detonated damaging 
the merchant tanker. This detonation would soon be followed by a second explosion at 0717 
EWT and a third at 0737 EWT. The third detonation proved to be all F.W. Abrams could 
withstand, and the merchant vessel sank quickly. Looking at this event logically, with the added 
knowledge that many merchant captains held a great contempt for U.S. Navy orders, it is quite 
an easy incident to break down (Freeman 1987:345; Wagner 2010:91; Bright 2012:110).    
 The cause and blame for this wrecking event fall on two offenders. First, the sudden 
weather system caused for great, unavoidable confusion as it often does in wartime events. This 
cannot be helped, sudden storms have been the cause of countless shipwrecks throughout time 
and the added danger of a minefield created for a dangerous environment. That being said, 
operating on the belief that the minefield was a necessary defense at this time, this portion of the 
event can and should be considered unfortunate incidental damage.  
Moving on to the second portion of the blame, Captain Coumelis and the crew of CG-484 
both claimed that the other was at fault. Claims of torpedo wakes by Captain Coumelis along 
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with the insistence by the crew of CG-484 that they issued several commands to Captian 
Coumelis that were ignored points to a good portion of the blame laid on Captian Coumelis. 
There were no torpedo wakes as the explosions were caused by mines and the choice to navigate 
to open sea was against the express orders issues by the 5th Naval District (ESF 194344:7,8; 
Freeman 1987:345-346; Wagner 2012:92).  
In all, the choices of a merchant captain and the uncontrollable nature of weather are to 
blame. The minefield being a static structure cannot move to initiate violence. It is, in theory, a 
defensive wall intended to keep enemies out. F.W. Abrams in a way ran into that wall, causing its 
own demise. One of the claims that Admiral Andrews made in his appeals to Admiral King for 
the removal of the minefield was the argument that the secretive nature of the minefield was 
causing a great deal of the issues with Allied merchant losses, citing this event (ESF 1943:6; 
Wagner 2012:88). This is a highly problematic argument. It is the opinon of this author that an 
important facet of the effectiveness of any minefield is the surprise element. If the merchant 
captains were issued the knowledge and extent of the minefield, this could have arguably leaked 
to the German U-boat Corps, making Cape Hatteras Minefield a higher value target.  
The next issue with this argument is that if the merchant captains were held more 
accountable to the orders published by the navy, the function of the minefield would have been 
significantly improved in the case of F.W. Abrams. As it has been said before, the merchant 
captains were traditionally wary of the orders given by the US Navy (Geroux 2016:94). As seen 
in the wrecking event of the merchant oil tanker F.W. Abrams, the merchant crew felt as if they 
did not need the naval escort and could make their own heading out of the minefield. Moving to 




Convoy KS-520: The Wrecking of Keshena and Chilore 
 A month after the sinking of F.W. Abrams, the minefield experienced the most violent 
event. The attack of Convoy KS-520 is highlighted in the timeline above (Figure 73). After 
rounding the coast of North Carolina on 14 July 1942, the convoy was struck by fast, intense 
violence from the German U-boat U-576. The merchant vessel Chilore was immediately struck 
by two torpedoes, followed by J.A. Mowinckel taking one torpedo hit. Understanding the need to 
evacuate the 60 wounded merchant sailors and attempt to save the damaged ships, Convoy 
Commodore, Captain N.L. Nichols ret. relinquished his command and joined the crews aboard 
J.A. Mowinckel. The two merchant ships and the escort ship Spry began to make their way 
towards Hatteras Inlet (ESF 1942b; ESF 1943:10; Freeman 1987:413-415; Wagner 2012:98). 
 
FIGURE 73. Timeline briefly highlighting the major events leading to the wrecking event of Keshena and Chilore 
deactivation (Source: Freeman 1987, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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 Their course brought them directly on a path to interact with Cape Hatteras Minefield. 
This charting was due to the commanding officer on Spry, LtCdr. Maxim Firth, not wanting to 
press the higher ranking Cpt. Nichols to respond to his calls for a change of course. This lack of 
communication was further compounded by the three ships ignoring two separate attempts by the 
minefield patrolling assets to warn them off their path. One dirigible dropped smoke in an effort 
to warn them off their path, while a patrol vessel tried to chase them down, firing their guns in a 
bid to get their attention. Regardless, the three ships plowed directly into the minefield resulting 
in both Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel striking mines. Remarkably, the two ships remained afloat. 
The action did not stop there, four days later after two tugboats were dispatched to tow the two 
merchant ships to have repairs made, the tug Keshena strayed out of the swept channel. This 
misstep resulted in a mine detonation, causing the tug to sink and killing two. Five days later, as 
the two merchant ships were being towed to Virginia by the tug J.A. Martin, Chilore floundered 
and sunk off of Cape Henry, Virginia (ESF 1942b; Freeman 1987:415). 
 The first major issue in this event is the lack of communication by the escort captain and 
the former Convoy Commodore. When Cpt. Nichols left command of the convoy; he was no 
longer the superior officer. LtCdr. Firth had every right and responsibility to request the proper 
headings from Cpt. Nichols. Escort vessels frequently operated off dead reckoning as they were 
tasked with leaving the convoy and patrolling for U-boats. This was a major lapse in command 
judgment and can be put on Cpt. Firth for being reluctant to perform his duties. The next major 
blunder was ignoring the two attempts by patrol vessels to warn the convoy ships from their 
heading. It is reported that Cpt. Firth believed the smoke to simply be warning the ships that U-
boats were in the area. No comments were made about the Coast Guard vessel that attempted to 
stop the convoy ships. These once again were major blunders on the command of LtCdr. Firth, 
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who, after the two merchant ships were struck by mines, maneuvered Spry out of the field and 
left the scene to return to the convoy (ESF 1942b; ESF 1943:8; Freeman 1987:418; Wagner 
2012:100). 
 Finally, one of the biggest glaring inconsistencies that have persisted from the beginning 
of this project is how Chilore is considered a victim of the minefield. By the time the two 
merchant vessels entered the minefield, Chilore had already been struck by two torpedoes. After 
adding a mine detonation to the ship’s damage, it was still afloat and was seaworthy enough to 
be towed 190 miles as can be seen in Final Route of Chilore (Figure 49). The final resting place 
of Chilore is nowhere near the minefield, and, even after taking a massive amount of damage 
from two U-boat torpedoes, the vessel was still afloat. Once again, when considering Cape 
Hatteras Minefield as a static wall, neither the sinking of Chilore nor Keshena (Figure 74) are the 
minefield’s fault in the way that the sinking of Bluefields was U-576’s fault. Both vessels were 
lost due to grave operational errors perpetrated by those in command. 
 FIGURE 74. The tug Keshena (Source: The Mariners’ Museum). 
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A Comparative Look: Minefield and Convoys 
 The only way to guarantee that a defense system will have no casualties is to be at peace. 
However, there are introductions to the battlefield landscape that are touted as changes that 
turned the tide of battle. Battle of the Atlantic scholars and naval officers have often promoted 
the convoy system as one of these introductions (Andrews in Hickman 1991:134; Axelrod 
2007:247: Bright 2010:133; Wagner 2012:102). There are specific benefits of the convoy 
system; for instance, during the Battle of the Atlantic when military vessels were in short order, 
the convoy system allowed for multiple merchant ships to be under the watch of military escort 
vessels. However, this system was not perfect. If it had been then no merchant casualties would 
have occurred after the instatement of convoys (Figure 75), this is highlighted to show that 
Andrew’s overly hostile opinion of the minefield was unwarrented.  
 
FIGURE 75. Pie chart showing the comparison between the ships lost and damaged in the minefield and in the 
convoy system (Source Hague 2000, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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When applying the same pressure and reasonings as Admiral Andrews when petitioning Admiral 
King for the removal of the minefield, it can be seen where the argument breaks down. Take the 
attack on Convoy KS-520 as an example. First, given the theoretical doctrine of convoy systems, 
larger numbers of merchant ships and various escort vessels should have warned off any attack 
by U-boats to start. As shown above, this was not the case: U-576 not only attacked Convoy KS-
520 but surfaced in the middle of the convoy and was able to hit three ships with torpedoes. This 
can absolutely be construed as a failure on the convoy’s part as Bluefields, and arguably Keshena 
and Chilore were sunk due to a breakdown in the safety of the convoy system. This was not the 
only case of convoys being attacked. In fact, throughout the duration of the war 1,705 Allied 
merchant ships were either damaged or sunk by German U-boats. This is obviously a far cry 
from the four ships (F.W. Abrams, Chilore, J.A. Mowinckel, and Keshena) that were damaged or 
sunk by Cape Hatteras Minefield; even less when it is taken into consideration that two of the 
ships were damaged both in convoy and in the minefield (Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel). 
This comparison is not intended to attack the convoy system; it is meant to highlight the 
comparatively irrelevant number of ships lost or damaged by the minefield. It also serves to act 
as a measurable comparison to a defense system that was in use at the same time the minefield. It 
shows that the cornerstone of Admiral Andrews’ argument of the minefield’s damage to 
merchant shipping could much easier be applied to the significant losses experienced by 
merchant ships in convoy. It also shows that even a defense system so highly regarded as the 
convoy system still suffered major collateral damage that could be extrapolated over the duration 
of the war. The minefield system, on the other hand, was never fully installed and was 
deactivated very shortly after becoming active. Therefore, there is no way to measure what the 




 In order to understand how the minefield functioned as a military defensive structure and 
further categorize its static operation in a fluid environment, the theoretical framework that was 
discussed in Chapter Three: Theory will be applied. To quickly recap, this project seeks to 
employ the United States Army’s method of METT-T and KOCOA battlefield terrain analysis. 
While there are setbacks from using a land-based analysis system, there are still benefits from 
subjecting the minefield to this analysis. 
 
METT-T 
 This section will take the METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available and 
Time Available) system and break down each battlefield consideration as it applies to Cape 
Hatteras Minefield. The mission of the minefield was to provide a haven for Allied merchant 
ships that were traveling up or down the American East Coast. The minefield was charged 
simply to create a wall in which merchant vessels could dock for the night when U-boat attacks 
were at their highest. Unlike most defense systems, which are propelled towards the enemy, this 
mission was not to be accomplished by any type of outward aggression; it was a static defensive 
system. However, as the minefield itself can cause damage, it is contrary to a traditional 
fortification or base where barricades are augmented with weapons. It puts the minefield in an 
interesting category of its own when considering that naval warfare is based entirely around the 
ability to be fluid, constantly moving whereas held ground is much more of a general concept. 
The static mined port minefield offers an interesting challenge to a terrestrial theoretical system.  
The E portion of METT-T refers to Enemy. In the case of the minefield, the enemy is 
simply the German U-boats that had the proclivity for sudden, devastating attacks against 
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merchant vessels. The German U-boats had the advantage of maneuverability and armament 
when facing merchant vessels. The advantages of German U-boats are part of the reason they 
were still marginally successful while attacking merchant convoys. From a theoretical 
standpoint, METT-T was intended for the sailor, marine or solider to chose the best suited 
battlefield and weapons to use therein. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that matching the 
static minefield with the German U-boats would rob the U-boats of one of their greatest 
attributes in mobility. As U-boats primarily hunted at night in order to take advantage over 
merchant ships, the safe harbor offered by the minefield could have served to rob this benefit as 
well.  
While the Type XIIC was the most commonly used U-boat by the Kriegsmarine 
throughout the war, various altered designs were constructed.  The Type XIIC itself was armed 
with five torpedo tubes, had a top speed of 17.7 knots on the surface, and 7.6 knots submerged 
and was specifically designed as an attack U-boat.  Many of the other U-boat types were created 
for specific operational purposes rather than just as upgrades to the Type VIIC.  For instance, the 
Type XIV known as the Milch Cow were designed specifically as refuel ships.  Their role was to 
support Type VII and Type IX attack U-boats during patrols by carrying fuel, torpedoes, food, 
and other supplies.  This allowed attack type U-boats to stay at sea longer (Elliott 1977:221). 
While the Type XIIC could be considered the workhorse of the Kriegsmarine U-boat 
arm, the Type IXB was the most successful attack submarine in terms of total tonnage sunk.  
While only fourteen were constructed, each averaged over 100,000 tons.  This can be partially 
attributed to the store of twenty-two 21-inch torpedoes that supported six torpedo tubes.   The 
Type IXB had a much larger range of 12,000 miles as compared to the Type XIIC, which only 
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ranged 8,500 miles.  For this purpose, they were initially used exclusively for Operation 
Drumbeat, which saw German U-boats on the American east coast.  Type IX eventually joined 
the Type IXB U-boats and Type VII U-boats who could reach American waters when supported 
by Milch Cows (Elliott 1977:221). 
The first T (Terrain) will be fully explored in the next section through analysis of 
KOCOA. Next, Troops Available in this case will refer to ships available for various roles and 
was a predominant theme throughout the Battle of the Atlantic. There was a massive shortage of 
battle worthy vessels for the use of homeland defense as most resources were being diverted to 
the war effort. The minefield’s finish date was delayed as the few minelayers available to 
homeland defense were needed elsewhere. Following laying the mines, troops and vessels 
available were scarce enough for the U.S. Navy to convert commercial vessels into equipped 
patrol vessels. Local air support was present but was not particularly strong. This is why the 
system of mined anchorages was an appealing tactic. Instead of needing a large fleet of escort 
vessels, a smaller number of less seaworthy vessels could stay closer to shore and patrol a fixed 
point. Vessels such as YP-389 were converted trawlers that were outfitted with a three-inch deck 
gun, two depth charge rails, six depth charges and two .30 caliber machine guns (Figure 76) 
(ESF 1942b; Headquarters Fifth Naval District 1942:3-6,9-10; ESF 1943:8; Freeman 1987:352, 
Wagner 2012:93). 
Time Available, the last metric of METT-T, poses another interesting thought for the 
minefield. Time Available typically refers to time needed to set up a military operation, most 
often with a shorter overall duration. However, when considering time for the minefield, it is not 
just time needed to set up the minefield, but also the duration of the minefield’s life that had to 
be considered. It was necessary that minefield was able to last throughout the entirety of the 
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engagement, which had no foreseeable end. This meant the need for experienced minesweepers 
was incredibly high in order to police the minefield and keep secure channels swept and cleared. 
Another major toll in time was how long it would take to install all 12 of the mined anchorages 
off of the eastern coast. As only two mined anchorages were ever laid, and, thus the system was 
incomplete. The constraints of Troops Available and the Time Available were proved too 
prodigious to finish. Had more resources and time been allocated to the minefield system, a 
much more productive outcome could have been produced. 
 
 





 In conjunction with the system of METT-T, KOCOA (Key Terrain, Observations, and 
Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of Approach) will be used to better 
understand the placement of Cape Hatteras Minefield and the movement of the battlefield around 
it. Key Terrain in context of Cape Hatteras Minefield is exceedingly important because the 
placement of a static structure had to produce the best results in terms of protection against 
German U-boats. In this case, as was mentioned before in Chapter Two: History, the coastal 
waters of North Carolina have significant advantages to the German U-boats. As the continental 
shelf is at its narrowest is only 33.5 nautical miles, it allowed the U-boats to initiate a surprise 
attack and then quickly flee back to deep waters where they could avoid detection by Allied 
ships (Figure 77). 
The geography also gave the U-boats a known point at which to find Allied merchant 
ships. In a bid to avoid deeper waters, merchant ships would travel closely along the coastline. 
This created the bottleneck that was mentioned in earlier chapters. Thus, placement of the 
minefield created a strategic safe point in an area plagued with enemy U-boats. It not only 
created a port of safe harbor for Allied merchant ships but also provided a Section Base at 
Ocracoke that could be used to bolster Allied forces in the region. The greater number of forces 
in the region and a static structure that could provide not only safety for Allied merchant ships 
but also held the possibility of harming U-boats that attempted to penetrate the minefield aiding 
the war effort. 
 As can be seen in Convex Hull Overlay (Figure 78), the edges of each of the battlefield 
areas from the three time periods overlay at some point near the location of the minefield. The 
centroid of each is shown, depicting movement of the center of the battle over time. The issues 
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with using a convex hull analysis for this purpose is that each polygon represents a significant 
amount of dead space in which there was no battlefield action. This can foreseeably cause the 
polygons to misrepresent the actual extent of a naval battle. However, what can be seen is the 
lessening of the scale of the battlefield, and, therefore, the terrain involved after the minefield 
had been installed. 
 The Observations and Fields of Fire refer to any point on the landscape that allows 
observation of the movements, deployments, and activity of the enemy that is not necessarily key 
terrain. On a flat surface, such as the surface of the ocean, there are not many changes in the line 
of sight. However, in this case, the minefield working in conjunction with the Section Base at 
Ocracoke offering the Allies air coverage; thus, changing the elevation and offering the Allies a 
better field of vision. Continuing with the theme of advancing technology, SONAR, RADAR 
and radio communications all began extend the ability of “sight” for the Allies, these come into 
play heavily in the roles of Hunter-Killer groups towards the end of the war. The mines 
themselves offer a new look on fields of fire. As mines are subsurface, as were the U-boats much 
of the possible engagements would happen out of the direct line of sight of surface vessels. This 
also places a new look on Cover and Concealment. In the past when KOCOA has been applied to 
naval engagements, this category referred to things such as storms as the flat surface of the ocean 
does not normally offer any other forms of concealment (Bright 2012). However, much of the 
German U-boats time was spent concealed by the ocean itself. Therefore, the use of mines and 
their subsurface habitat offered a direct challenge to the German U-boats, creating cover and 
concealment where there was none.  
The Obstacle section of KOCOA is described as landscape elements that hinder troop 
movement and affect the ultimate course of battle such as hazards to navigation both natural and 
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man-made. The minefield itself represents a human-made hazard to navigation, as seen in the 
wrecking event of F.W. Abrams. As with any navigational hazard, the merchant ships would 
have to be made aware in order to avoid a collision. However, as discussed earlier, the U.S. Navy 
could not disclose the actual nature of the minefield and simply labeled the area a navigational 
hazard. This became an issue due to the nature of the hazard itself, unlike most navigational 
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FIGURE 77. Map showing the three time periods wrecking locations subjected to a convex hull analysis (Source: 
Hoyt et al. 2017, Created by: Mitchell Freitas 2016). 
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hazards the minefield took up an exorbitant amount of area and posed a danger at any point. This 
intentional misleading for the sake of operational security gave a false sense of safety to the 
captain and crew of F.W. Abrams, who believed they were skilled enough to navigate the hazard 
themselves. 
Finally, Avenues of Approach is described as corridors used to transfer troops between 
the core battle area and outer logistical zones or natural aids to navigation along the prescribed 
route. This overlaps heavily with the Key Terrain section as the coastline and the continental 
plate provided for and fostered the movement of merchant vessels down the coast. In total, these 
two systems are used to analyze the placement and battle surrounding Cape Hatteras Minefield. 
It shows the flaws of applying a terrestrial system of analysis to a naval battlefield as well as the 
flaws in applying this method to a static defense system. This is something that should be 
reassessed if a naval-specific theoretical framework is ever created. Perhaps the thought 
processes being played out in this study could contribute to the formulation of such a paradigm. 
 
Conclusion 
 This concludes the analysis section of this work, the next chapter Conclusion, will 
address if the analysis presented above were able to assess a minefield successfully. It will also 
serve to address the historical narrative of the minefield and assert in finality if it was justified or 
not. The analysis markers presented in this chapter were the products of the research questions 
posed at the beginning of this work. The lives and ships lost during across the engagement were 
discussed in order to make a case for the relative security that was afforded to merchant shipping 
as the engagement progressed. The natural progression from examining the ships lost was to 
consider the tonnage lost both in ship and cargo. As stated in this chapter, the ship itself was an 
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important commodity but the cargo ships carried allowed for a direct value comparison across 
the three time periods. The safety and security of the minefield were assessed by reexamining the 
events leading up to the sinking of the merchant ships lost in the minefield. This was important 
to establish a direct assessment of the traditional narrative. Lastly, the minefield was subjected to 
the theoretical framework of METT-T and KOCOA. These evaluations will be concluded in the 




















CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 In order to conclude this work, it is imperative that the questions outlined in the 
introduction were fully addressed. The primary question being “What methods are suitable for 
the assessment of the success or failure of naval minefields during the Second World War?”. The 
subject of this study was Cape Hatteras Minefield, a defensive installation off the coast of North 
Carolina that was labeled as a failure by high ranking naval officers such as Admiral Adolphus 
Andrews. Each of the secondary questions asked at the beginning of this work were to serve as 
possible avenues of assessment and were each put into the context of Cape Hatteras Minefield, 
some with a large success while others may be better served with other minefields due to site 
specific issues. These analytical questions will be addressed briefly in this chapter to determine 
their usefulness in assessing a naval minefield. Shown below for easy reference are those 
original questions. 
Primary: 
 What methods are suitable for the assessment of the success or failure of naval minefields 
during the Second World War? 
Secondary: 
How can the success of a minefield be defined? 
 Categorizing Minefields 
o Minefields are both passive and active depending on the situation; therefore, can 
they be assessed by a single set of standards?  
 Economic stability 
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o How will economic records and statistics reflect the presence of the minefield? 
 Survival and Safety 
o Can the safe passage of tonnage past Cape Hatteras whose goods were used to 
fuel the war effort be cited as the success of the minefield? 
How can the failure of a minefield be ascertained? 
 Economic losses 
o How many ships were lost? 
o How much cargo was lost? 
o How much local commerce was lost in the form of local fishing and shipping? 
 Losses to human life 
o What was the total number of crew lost to the minefield? 
o Was there negative public perception of the minefield? 
o Was there political pressure to remove the minefield? 
 
Categorizing Minefields 
 Minefields are both passive and active depending on the situation; therefore, can they be 
assessed by a single set of standards? 
As seen in the last chapter, this question was addressed using the United States Army’s 
battlefield assessment framework known as METT-T and KOCOA. While for this study they 
served their purpose, however, these systems for use by maritime archaeologists have their 
drawbacks. First, the most glaring issue is that these frameworks were created for terrestrial use 
and therefore are designed for environments with more natural cover and for the most part 
understanding that the enemy will not be underneath the user’s position. The second shortcoming 
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is centered around the user of the systems. METT-T and KOCOA were designed for army 
officers to be used in the field to quickly address the landscape and set up the most adventitious 
battlefield. The use in archaeology is different. The archaeologist is utilizing these assessments 
with full knowledge of pre-, during, and post-engagement. This is a great deal more data than 
these frameworks were meant to process. It may be an area of future study in which an 
archaeological system of battlefield interpretation and assessment can be created to offer a more 
robust structure of analysis. This study may contribute to a new paradigm, other studies have 
pointed out the same shortcomings of KOCOA and METT-T (Simonds 2014; Parker 2016). 
 While the standards, in this case, were imperfect, it is possible to address them by a 
single set of standards. The assessment work performed in this work provided solid supporting 
information that helped inform the choices behind the need and placement of Cape Hatteras 
Minefield. This, however, should not be considered the paramount quantifier for the success or 
failure of the minefield as it was originally believed. Other methods of investigation proved to be 
much more successful and had a greater impact on the study. This may be due to more data 




 How will economic records and statistics reflect the presence of the minefield? 
As one of the arguments against Cape Hatteras Minefield was the impact on local fishing, 
local records were investigated to ascertain the incidence of the minefield on the local economy. 
What was not considered was the immense impact that the war had on the home front. This 
caused a suppression of all local economy numbers, especially after rationing was enacted. Most 
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records were either incomplete, missing, or too impacted by the war to find any type of pattern 
that could indicate the minefield’s impact. The best that could be done to counter Admiral 
Andrews’ fishing argument was to show the elastic nature of North Carolina’s fishing economy 
and the impact that other major events had not only on the total weight of fish caught but also the 
value thereof. In all, it might be possible to apply this assessment to other minefields of other 
engagements depending on local records.  
 
Survival and Safety 
 Can the safe passage of tonnage past Cape Hatteras whose goods were used to fuel the 
war effort be cited as the success of the minefield? 
While the above was the original question, it had to be amended throughout the research 
process in order to work with more reasonable and tangible data. The path of this questioning 
proved outside the scope of this study to follow as once the cargo arrived on site, it was 
impossible to definitely tell if that cargo was used successfully and made a difference.  Instead, 
the minefield statistics were compared with those of contemporary defense systems such as the 
convoy system to assess survival and safety. In the case of Cape Hatteras Minefield where the 
reputation centered around the loss of three Allied merchant ships, it was an easy comparison in 
safety to the 1,705 ships lost while in convoy. The division of the sunk merchant ships into three 
periods offered an easy framework in which to compare the safety across the progression of the 
battle. These, as the reader is in no doubt familiar with at this point, were the Pre-Minefield 
Period, the Active-Minefield Period and the Post-Minefield period. This allowed for the 
collection of tangible data showing the progression of the relative safety of the merchant 
shipping lanes throughout the protracted engagement. Upon further analysis of the safety of the 
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minefield, it will be unequivocally asserted by this author that the wrecking event of the 
merchant ship Chilore was not the fault of the minefield and should be credited as a mark by U-
576 and a victim of a convoy attack. Chilore was struck by two torpedoes and was then 
subsequently led into the minefield by situationally incompetent officers in charge. The ships 
were warned multiple times to halt their progress into the minefield but refused to even 
acknowledge the warnings. Lastly, Chilore was in good enough shape to be towed into another 
state’s waters where it floundered, a culmination of damage could have been the reason the 
merchant ship ultimately sank, but the initial damage and the leadership from convoy KS-520 are 
to blame here. Furthermore, the author is comfortable confirming that both the wrecking of F.W. 
Abrams and Keshena remain credited to the minefield, despite the breakdown in communication 
on the part of the crews of F.W. Abrams and Spry. 
 
How Can the Failure of A Minefield Be Ascertained? 
While initially separated as success and failure questions, the questions in this section 
were amalgamated into the overall process of assessment. Therefore, questions in this section 
will seem out of order as compared to the layout of the Results and Analysis chapters. 
Economic Losses 
 How many ships were lost? 
 How much cargo was lost? 
The question of “How many ships were lost?” was the easiest to populate with data, and yet 
proved to be the most critical to this thesis. The ships lost field served as a cornerstone for the 
division of the time periods and provided the most striking visual maps. This can especially be 
seen when comparing the Pre-Minefield Sinkings with the Active-Minefield and Post-Minefield 
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sinking maps. When asking if a number of ships lost can determine the failure of a minefield, the 
answer is that it certainly can. However, the questions in this section should be made clear that 
this is considering friendly ships, cargo, and crew lost. In the case of Cape Hatteras Minefield, 
the two ships lost while on the micro scale were important when compared to the overall macro 
of the Battle of the Atlantic are statistically irrelevant and should not impact the assessment of 
the minefield. 
The question of cargo lost also provided crucial competitive data. When looking at the cargo 
lost in the Pre-Minefield Period compared to the cargo lost in the minefield the numbers are 
astounding. The only cargo lost directly to the minefield were the 80,000 barrels of fuel oil 
carried by F.W. Abrams. While this is a substantial loss in a vacuum, it is once again an 
insignificant statistical number in the overall conflict. During the Battle of the Atlantic 
specifically, where so much importance was riding on the transference of goods and 
commodities this is a paramount question to be asked by any researcher looking at any of the 
other minefields placed during the conflict.   
 
Losses to Human Life 
 What was the total number of crew lost to the minefield? 
 Was there negative public perception of the minefield? 
 Was there political pressure to remove the minefield? 
The loss of lives in association with the wrecking events logically became linked directly 
with the question of how many ships were lost. Initially, the thought was to separate them as the 
loss of human life tends to carry more weight with both decisions being made by military 
officers and politics as well as the public’s perception of the military action in question. The 
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question of the crew lost was supportive in comparing the time periods and should be looked at 
in any assessment of a minefield. What was found early in the research was that the minefield’s 
true nature, due to operational security, was not disclosed to even the merchant captains that 
were operating their vessels in mined waters let alone the general public. It would be an 
interesting comparison to see if this is different in the cases of other minefields and the question 
may be asked as a tertiary or supplemental question and not as a secondary question.  
 Finally, the question of the political pressures to remove the minefield served to be one of 
the roots of the original issues with Cape Hatteras Minefield. It was not necessarily pressured 
from politicians but the pressure of navy brass in the form of Admiral Andrews; to remove the 
minefield. In the case of most if not all military installations, it is important to look at the biases 
and influences of the naval officers in charge of the project. Admiral Andrews’ had invested 
interest in the convoy system and served as the major voice against the minefield. Many of his 
claims were exaggerated, and the written proposals to Admiral King for its removal served as the 
cornerstone of the bastardization of Cape Hatteras Minefield by following accounts. 
As a side note, as the author of this study, I have thrown around phrases such as “statistically 
insignificant” when addressing ships sunk in and around the minefield. It is unavoidable that 
these wrecking events are tied to the loss of crew. While in a macro research study, the crew lost 
is frequently represented only by a number. It is important to remember that each one of those 
numbers represents a human life lost which many times impacted a family at home. Mothers, 
fathers and other relatives lost loved ones during a conflict that barely garners a passing mention 
in high school and college history courses. Therefore, it is up to the stewards of the Battle of the 




Final Verdict  
 The last word of this thesis on the success or failure of Cape Hatteras Minefield is as 
follows. While Cape Hatteras Minefield is completely undeserving of the overly negative 
connotations attached by Admiral Andrews, it cannot be determined to the full extent if the 
minefield was a true success or failure. This is due to the fact that Cape Hatteras Minefield was 
intended to be one of twelve mined anchorages of which, only one other was installed in Florida 
(Lott 1959:43).   In addition, while waiting on the minelayers to arrive at Cape Hatteras and 
begin the installation process, the convoy system had started to function. This makes it hard to 
attribute increased merchant security solely to the minefield definitively. In fact, much of the 
reasoning the minefield plan was agreed upon in the first place was due to the United States 
Navy attempting to field as many Anti-Submarine Warfare defenses at the disposal of the navy 
as possible. 
 This may seem anti-climactic after working through much of the data included in this 
work but, it is the most unbiased and fair assessment that could be offered. Cape Hatteras 
Minefield has been vindicated to some degree with the earlier assertion that the merchant ships 
Chilore that was traveling as part of Convoy KS-520, was struck by two torpedoes from U-576, 
one mine from Cape Hatteras Minefield and could be towed into the waters of another state 
before sinking was not the fault of the minefield. If the entire mined anchorage system was 
installed and was given the time to function properly the results may have been different. 
 
Future Research  
 There are several avenues that future research can take in both the assessment of 
minefields and specifically the mined anchorage system of the Battle of the Atlantic. First, it 
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would be the hope of this author that the structure of this thesis is applied by a future researcher 
to a minefield of a different time and conflict. An excellent example of this would be the 
assessment of the minefields in use during the Russo-Japanese War. This would be even more 
advantageous if the arguments used in this thesis were applied to a naval engagement specific 
version of METT-T/KOCOA as mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is imperative that at some 
point a theoretical structure that can accommodate the questions of archaeologists (not just those 
of military officers) in a naval setting is developed. 
 Concerning the mined anchorage system, it would be an interesting comparison to assess 
the mined anchorage installed off the coast of Florida with the same questions asked in this 
thesis. Furthermore, regarding Cape Hatteras Minefield itself, several lines of research could not 
be contained within the scope of the study. For instance, at the time of writing this thesis, it is not 
known if a record of ships was kept as they utilized the minefield. This data would surely bolster 
the data contained within this thesis. Furthermore, the German U-boat accounts could be better 
utilized and the view of the enemy taken into more consideration. While this is not a research 
question that could be undertaken by a graduate student, it would be extremely interesting if a 
survey could be done in the area currently marked as a “Navigation Hazzard” to determine if any 
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APPENDIX A: SHIP LIST 
Ship Name Lives 
Lost 







4569 6,666 tons General Army 
Supplies 
Individual   




4834 5,890 tons General Army 
Supplies 





Jan 18 1942 6635 72,870 barrels Crude Oil Individual   
Amerikaland 5 
 
Feb 3 1942 15355 Unknown Individual   
Arabutan 1 
 




















11628 110,000 barrels Crude 
Oil 
Individual   
Blink 24 
 





























2609 3,600 tons Manganese 
Ore 












3014 Manganese Ore Individual   
Ciltvaira 2 
 





Jan 19 1942 5269 2,870 tons General 
Supplies 
Individual   






8272 6,612 tons General 
Supplies 
Individual   









7,217 11,036 tons General 
Army Supplies 
Individual   




2368 3,800 tons General 
Supplies, 104 tons 
Explosives 
Individual   




8046 96,000 barrels Crude Oil Individual   




5106 118,000 barrels Heating 
Oil 







7164 7,000 tons General Army 
Supplies 
Individual   
Empire Gem 49 
 
Jan 24 1942 8139 10,692 tons Motor Spirit, 
920 tons Machinary 







6160 5,000 tons Rock 
Phosphate, 740 tons 
TNT, 2,800 tons Citrous 
Pulp 

















5719 5,415 tons General 
Supplies, 2,602 tons 
Explosives 
Individual   
165 
 




11641 141,981 barrels Crude 
Oil 







6878 General Army Supplies Individual   
Koll 3 
 





Jan 19 1942 7988 2,908 tons General 
Supplies 
Individual   
Lancing 1 
 
April 7 1942 7866 8,900 barrels Fuel Oil Individual   
Leif 15 
 
Feb 28 1942 1582 2,300 tons General 
Supplies 










Feb 6 1942 3431 Unknown Individual   
Malchace 1 
 





3352 4,508 tons Sugar Individual   
Marore 0 
 





5375 72,000 barrels Heating 
Oil 





10,389 14,000 barrels Clean Oil Individual   
Norvana 29 
 





5766 8,300 tons Manganese 
Ore 
Individual   
Olympic 35 
 
Jan 22 1942 5335 Unknown Individual   
Otho 32 
 
April 3 1942 4839 4,400 tons MO, 1,296 
tons PO, 750 tons Tin 
Individual   
Rio Blanco 19 
 
April 1 1942 4086 6,440 tons Iron Ore Individual   




8072 11,000 barrels Aviation 
Spirit 
Individual   
166 
 




6,069 3,200 barrels General 
Supplies 
Individual   




6176 7,660 tons General Army 
Supplies 










6943 10,200 barrels Fuel Oil Individual   
Tolosa 22 
 





14647 9,544 tons General 
Supplies, 4,000 tons Pig 
Iron 
HX-232   
Venore 17 
 
Jan 24 1942 8017 8,000 tons Iron Ore Individual   
Victolite 47 
 
Feb 11 1942 11,410 Water Ballast Individual   




5939 65,000 barrels Fuel Oil Individual   
West Ivis 45 
 






         
Anna 0 
 





2063 General Supplies KS-520   
Chilore 0 Minefield July 15 
1942 












0 Minefield June 11 
1942 
9621 90,000 barrels Fuel Oil Individual   
J.A. 
Mowinckel 
2 Not Sunk July 15 
1942 
11147 N/A KS-520   
Keshena 2 Minefield July 19 
1942 














3289 4,100 tons Sugar, 850 
barrels Fuel Oil, 25 tons 
Wood 










3845 6,675 tons Manganese 
Ore 
Convoy   
Pleasantville 2 
 
June 8 1942 4,549 3,000 tons Phosphate Individual   
West Notus 4 
 






















6959 General Army Supplies Individual   
Libertad 24 
 
Dec 4 1943 5441 8,000 tons sugar KN-280   
Panam 2 
 







6,507 6,700 tons General Army 
Supplies 




    
         
(Lloyd’s 1989; 
Hoyt et al 2017) 









































Total Ships Sunk:60 
Total Tonnage: 381,742 




Total Ships Sunk:14 
Total Tonnage: 84,633 

















































APPENDIX C: PRICE LIST 
      Pre-Minefield       
Item Quantity Year Bulk Price  1940s Price 2017 Price Notes 
Manganese 
Ore 
16,300 Tons 1942 $.72 Per Ton $11,736  $174,844.08    
Fuel Oil  215,219 Barrels  1942 $2.39 Per Barrel $514,373.41  $7,663,185.55    
Crude Oil 605,090 Barrels 1942 $1.11 Per Barrel $671,649.90  $10,006,306.14    
Chromium 
Ore 
2,006 Tons 1942 $16 Per Ton $32,096  $478,169.36    
Sulphur 11,000 Tons 1942 $16.01 Per Long Ton $157,080  $2,340,193.26    
Pig Iron 4,000 Tons 1942 $24 Per Ton $96,000  $1,430,217.42  * 
Iron Ore 37,440 Tons 1942 $4.45 Per Long Ton $148,624.44  $2,214,221.50    
Phosphates 3,600 Tons 1940 $3.08 Per Ton $11,088  $165,190.11    
Phosphate 
Rock 
5,000 Tons 1942 $3.57 Per Long Ton $15,923.28  $237,226.59    
Gas Oil 13,000 Barrels 1942 $4.36 Per Barrel $56,680  $844,424.20    
Newsprint 6,200 Tons 1942 $50 Per Ton $310,000  $4,618,410.43    
Coke 9,680 Tons 1942 $9.41 Per Ton $91,088.10  $1,357,039.45    
Tin 750 Tons 1942 $100 Per Ton $75,000  $1,117,357.36  * 
Sugar 4,508 Tons 1942 $92 Per Ton $414,736  $6,178,777.64    
Soda Ash 3,628 Tons 1942 $21 Per Ton $76,188  $1,135,056.30  * 
Palm Oil 1,296 Tons 1942 $.12 Per Drum- .74 Per Ton $959.04  $14,287.87    
Motor Gas 10,692 Barrels 1942 $2.68 Per Barrel $28,654.56  $426,898.45    
Heating Oil 190,000 Barrels 1939 $1.57 Per Barrel $298,300  $4,444,102.68  * 
Benzine 10,000 Tons 1939 $2.47 Per Barrel $24,700  $367,983.02    
Aviation Gas 11,000 Barrels 1939 $2.45 Per Barrel $26,950  $401,503.75    
              
Total       $3,061,827  $45,615,395.16       
 




      Active-Minefield       
Item Quantity Year Bulk Price  1940s Price 2017 Price Notes 
Coal 1,739 Tons 1942 $7.54 Per Ton $13,112.06  $195,344.76  * 
Fuel Oil  225,850 Barrels 1942 $2.39 Per Barrel $539,781.50  $8,041,717.77    
Sugar 10,600 Tons 1942 $92 Per Ton $975,200  $14,528,625.33    
Manganese 
Ore 
6,675 Tons 1942 $.72 Per Ton $4,906  $73,090.07    
Flaxseed  7,400 Tons 1942 $2.47 Per Bushel-$88.21 Per Ton $652,754.00  $9,724,793.17    
Wood 25 Tons 1942 $45.49 Per 1,000 Feet/ $2,070 Per 
Pound 
$1,098.79  $16,369.88  * 
              
Total       2,186,852.35 $32,579,940.98       
 
 
   
      Post-Minefield       
Item Quantity Year Bulk Price  1940s Price 2017 Price Notes 
Sugar 80,000 Tons 1942 $92 Per Ton $736,000  $10,965,000.25    
              
Total       736,000 $10,965,000.25    
(Lloyd’s 1989; United States Department of Commerce) 
*Denotes average of similar items 
 
 
